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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

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1977

TURKEY

PART XI

JANUARY TO JUNE 1926

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Further Correspondence respecting Turkey.

PART XI.

No. 1.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received January* 3.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, January 3, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 1.
Following from naval reporting officer for Admiralty and Malta :—

"Reliable reports show that Gulf of Ismid and both sides of the Dardanelles are being fortified, and that mines have been laid in Gulf of Ismid. All available details have already been reported to the Foreign Office.

"Veracity of reports is supported by strict police prohibition of movements of foreigners in Dardanelles zone. Gun emplacements are being constructed near Selimieh barracks at Haidar Pasha.

"Cruiser 'Hamidieh' last reported at Rizeh, one gunboat at Trebizond, one other gunboat probably at Amasiah, one torpedo gunboat at Adalia, two gunboats at Smyrna, 'Torghud Reis' in Golden Horn; remaining units distributed between the Gulf of Ismid and Constantinople."

[E 61/59/44]

No. 2.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received January* 4, 1926.)

(No. 939.)
Sir,

Constantinople, December 30, 1925.

SINCE my despatch No. 908 of the 15th instant was written there have been no further disturbances in the country, so far as is generally known, but the enquiries of the Independence Tribunal in the Black Sea towns and, more recently, here have led to a little more information being published. The incident at Rizeh was evidently serious. It is officially admitted that the countryside was up in arms under the leadership of a priest and the headman of a village. The villagers assembled at a place outside Rizeh, captured the gendarmerie post, and proposed to take possession of the town, but the "Hamidieh's" bombardment seems to have checked them in time. The "Hamidieh" is believed to have landed men, and lost fifty killed and fifty wounded. The rallying cry was, so it is said by the tribunal: "There is revolution in Angora. Mustafa Kemal Pasha has been wounded in three places and is in the doctors' hands. Ismet Pasha is out of the way. The Government is in the hands of pashas who are religious. They are saving the sacred law. There is nothing to fear. Erzerum has done its bit. Let us do ours." As elsewhere, the rebels were repressed with vigour. Mr. Knight reported from Trebizond that eight men had been hanged and others sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment. It is admitted that thousands of rifles and revolvers have been handed in, but as the whole population on that coast is armed, that proves nothing in particular.

2. At Kerasund, too, the movement was religious. Fifty or sixty people were arraigned in due course before the Independence Tribunal, and two sheiks were put to death and a number of priests and others were sent to prison.

3. Here the Independence Tribunal have just finished a happy week staying at Tokatlian's Hotel and sending to Angora for trial some scores of old-fashioned men, particularly priests and dervishes, who object to wearing hats. The members of the tribunal are rough customers, who enjoy posing as the apostles of civilisation in Turkey, and indeed they are the instrument with which the Government is forcing Westernism on the country. They were kind enough to express themselves as very satisfied with the attitude of the generality of Constantinopolitans towards "modernism." They have unearthed here pamphlets which, they claim, had a subversive influence at Rizeh, Erzerum and Kerasund, but the pamphlets seem to have been written some time ago. One, written by a priest, condemns the tendency to Westernism as meaning little more than the adoption of Western vices and the abandonment of Moslem virtues. Since the hat was mentioned incidentally as the symbol of Westernism, the author has been sent to Angora for trial. The incident is trivial in itself, but the pamphlet is a fair indication of the feeling of the bulk of the uneducated population. They resent deeply what seems to them like an attempt not merely to do away with their own religion, but to turn them into unbelievers, and they cannot bear wearing the hat which has always been the mark of the infidel. This has been the cause of all the recent trouble. The Independence Tribunal has, however, come to the rescue of the authorities in dealing with awkward cases of a totally different nature. The stabilisation of the Turkish pound has been proved an elusive task, and a Jewish member of the Bourse has now been sent to Angora on a charge of speculating with intent to depreciate Turkish currency. Similarly, two Greeks who were bold enough to oppose the demolition of a Greek church for the purpose of widening a street have been despatched for trial.

4. There have been two changes in the Cabinet. Hamdullah Subhi Bey has had a breakdown and has been obliged to give up the portfolio of Public Instruction. This is regrettable, as he is a man of some refinement and breadth of view. He has been the moving spirit of the Turkish "ojaks," or clubs, an organisation which the Government uses to spread not only political propaganda, but ideas of citizenship in general. It has been a great factor in producing the present changing outlook. He is succeeded by Mustafa Nejati Bey, a young lawyer from Smyrna. As a henchman of the Ghazi, Nejati Bey has twice held office before. He has made a bad mess of the hopeless task of establishing the Moslem immigrants from Greece, as Minister of Reconstruction. As Minister of Justice last year, however, he put through some useful judicial reforms with a ruthlessness which was characteristic of himself, but upsetting to the older members of his profession. He is likely to stand for a forward policy in everything. The other change is at the Ministry of Public Works, and is due to the death of the Minister Suleiman Sirri Bey. The late Minister, who had spent his career in the Ministry, was not a strong personality nor an influence in politics. He is succeeded by Behij Bey, a retired colonel who has done well as manager of the Anatolian Railway and who will perhaps meddle as little in politics as his predecessor, but show more energy and ability, especially in railway construction which lies so near the heart of the Ghazi and Ismet Pasha.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 64/43/44] No. 3.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 4, 1926.)

(No. 942.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 29, 1925.*

AMONG the foreign representatives whom Tewfik Rushdi Bey received yesterday was the Egyptian Minister. Before Hedaya Pacha could broach the particular subject he desired to discuss, Tewfik Rushdi talked on several subjects of current political interest. He said he had been the object of a really enthusiastic reception at Belgrade, and that he was much satisfied with the result of his conversations with the Jugoslav Government. He then asked Hedaya what he thought of the Russian Treaty, and Hedaya answered, undiplomatically enough, that he had not read it. Tewfik Rushdi then said: "Dans tous les cas, je peux vous assurer que les Russes sont avec nous, corps et âme." Hedaya asked if Turkey was going to make war: "No," replied Tewfik

Rushdi, "the question of Irak will be settled otherwise. We shall know how to speak to the people of Irak in a manner that will appeal to them, and we shall speak direct and not through their British administrators." Hedaya inferred that Turkey would send agitators to make trouble in Irak.

2. Tewfik Rushdi knows perfectly well that Hedaya is pro-British and likely to be in touch with this Embassy, and I expect the language he used was meant to be passed on to me.

3. The Polish Chargé d'Affaires was received with overwhelming, almost embarrassing, cordiality. Tewfik Rushdi exclaimed to him that he had returned, and not with empty hands; he had seen Chicherin, he had stopped in Belgrade, and for the future all must work together for an Oriental union of Slavs and Turks—a *cliché* which M. Schwarzburg Gunther tells me was largely used by Chicherin at Warsaw. M. Schwarzburg Gunther said something about Czechoslovakia, and Tewfik Rushdi snorted and said they were not Slavs. He then asked his Excellency whether there were any secret clauses to the treaty and was told that there were none. Russo-Turkish relations were so cordial that there was no need for secret clauses. He asked if the Mosul question could be settled by purchase, and Tewfik Rushdi replied that Turkey was not to be bought, and that no solution was possible that did not provide for the cession of Mosul town. Turkish prestige absolutely required it.

4. M. Schwarzburg Gunther had telegraphed to his colleague in Moscow to ask what he was to think of the Turco-Russian Treaty. The answer was that it was "bluff," and that neither militarily nor economically was Russia in any position to take steps involving the risk of hostilities.

5. In my own conversation with Tewfik Rushdi the treaty only came up casually, when his Excellency was explaining to me the extreme rapidity with which he worked. He told me that the first pourparlers took place on the Sunday. On the Thursday the terms of the treaty were negotiated in the morning, and the signature took place at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. I am inclined to think he was telling the truth; and I answered that I had noticed in the text of the instrument obvious signs of hasty drafting.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 65/43/44] No. 4.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 4, 1926.)

(No. 943.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 30, 1925.*

IN my despatch No. 930 of the 23rd December I had the honour to transmit to you the text of the Russo-Turkish treaty signed by Tewfik Rushdi Bey and M. Chicherin at Paris, as published in the local press. This treaty has certainly had the effect of heartening up Turkish feeling. As the League's procedure over the Mosul case slowly developed, opinion at Angora got more and more depressed, and the Polish Chargé d'Affaires tells me that towards the end of the League's session Angora felt so much cowed that there was practically no more talk of war. Hoping against hope that the worst would not come to them with the Council's decision, the depression had reached its lowest point when the treaty was published, and the reaction was quite striking. Angora behaved as if a great weight had been taken off its chest.

2. In the psychology of these reactions one naturally finds exaggeration, and this is freely expressed in the newspapers. The feelings of joy are now stated in almost lyrical terms: Turkey at last feels secure; the West has made its own Locarno Security Pact, which is aimed at the East, and now the East has answered with its own pact, which establishes a solid Asiatic front. European press writers, it is suggested, are in consternation at finding that Asiatic countries can no longer be bullied. Nevertheless, there are signs of weakness; naturally enough the Turkish case rests on assumptions, and no analysis of the treaty is attempted, or could be attempted, without giving the whole case away. If writers feel that the treaty itself is somewhat jejune, they supply the deficiency by broadly suggesting that it has secret articles, though they specifically deny their existence. For those in Turkey who still hanker after a Western

orientation of policy, the press makes the very utmost of the forty-eight hours which Tewfik Rushdi Bey spent at Belgrade on his way home and on the remarkably cordial reception he received there. What, I wonder, will they say to the very chilly communiqué which, according to this morning's news, the Jugoslav Government has now seen fit to issue? To praise of Serbia is added abuse of France, who is reproached and taunted in the bitterest terms for having attached herself to the chariot wheels of Turkey's enemies; and to a less extent of Bulgaria, whose reluctance to ratify M. Radev's treaty comes in for a good deal of blame. On the whole, the Turkish press to-day reminds one of a man walking through a dark forest by night and singing at the top of his voice to keep up his own courage.

3. As to the genesis of the treaty, Tewfik Rushdi Bey, as I reported in my despatch No. 942 of yesterday, suggests that it was a brilliant improvisation of his own, and, so far as he is concerned, this may be so, for I have no doubt that for a long time the Russians have desired to involve the Turks in some sort of political treaty, and if they have not actually proposed one, it was because the Turks were hanging back. Now, however, it was the Turks who must have taken the initiative, anxious in the last degree, after a serious check, to re-establish the confidence of their public and the internal prestige of their Government. It is typical of Turkish diplomacy that it should put itself in the position of having to beg for something which the Russians wanted to give, but at a moment when the latter were only prepared to give with a stingy hand. I see no necessity to suppose that any secret clauses are attached to the treaty. It is the general opinion of neutral observers here that none such exist.

4. In the treaty itself, therefore, there is little significance; but in the fact that a political treaty of any sort has been concluded between Turkey and Russia, there is a good deal. It is an indication of the stress which the Turkish Government has undergone, and of the severity of the check which it has received. For years past, in spite of Russian blandishments, Angora has refused to have anything but the loosest, if the most cordial, relations with Moscow, and the underlying distrust of Russian policy has sufficed to restrain the Turks from entering into any binding political relations. Even now the future is not compromised, but the Turk means his signature of the treaty to serve as a warning to the West that circumstances may force him to leave his position of equilibrium and come down on the Russian side of the fence.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 34/34/44] No. 5.

Mr. Addison to Sir W. Tyrrell.—(Received January 4, 1926.)

(No. 696.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin presents his compliments to His Majesty's Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to report that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has informed the commercial secretary at His Majesty's Embassy that a most-favoured-nation agreement between Germany and Turkey had been signed at Angora. The agreement does not, however, alter the existing state of affairs, as both countries have been according each other most-favoured-nation treatment for some months past. Germany has reduced the duty on raisins coming from Turkey to 8 marks per 100 kilog.

Berlin, December 31, 1925.

[E 241/241/44] No. 6.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 11, 1926.)

(No. 947.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 31, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that Turkey has now adopted the Gregorian calendar and the twenty-four-hour day. The official year, which begins to-morrow, will therefore be 1926 and not 1342, and 1 P.M. and 2 P.M. will be known officially as 13 o'clock and 14 o'clock, &c.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 224/224/44] No. 7.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 1. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January* 1, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith the annual report for 1925 on the heads of missions in Turkey. The parts of these notices reproduced from the reports of previous years are enclosed in brackets and dated.

2. Since last year the diplomatic status of most missions has been fixed, but in some cases abnormal relations still continue. Against the name of each country I have written the status of its representative or, failing this, the nature of its treaty position towards Turkey.

3. As last year, I have divided the report into two parts—Constantinople and Angora. The number of missions permanently located at the capital is still four only, but I summarise what I know as to the various establishments maintained or contemplated at Angora at the moment of writing:—

Afghanistan: permanently established in a decent native house in the middle of the town.

France: a house has been leased in the centre of the town. Ground floor was a shop and has been turned into a "salle des fêtes" by M. Sarraut and furnished with a Gobelin tapestry and old silk chairs, settees and candelabra from the Embassy attics. All the other rooms in the house are extremely small.

Germany: a large area (28,000 square metres) on the Chankaya Road. There is a very good wooden house on it with a stone basement. The German Ambassador tells me his Government has just found the credits for the construction of a new stone house on the site.

Greece hires a good-sized native house in the middle of the town. In summer the Greek Legation always hires a house somewhere in the country, on the hills.

Hungary hires a small Evkaf house in the town, where a secretary lives permanently as liaison officer for the Minister, who resides normally in Constantinople, but visits the capital fairly often.

Italy has selected a site of about 24,000 square metres in the Chankaya district, but the transfer of the land has not yet been effected. The Italian Government intends to put up some sort of building on it, but plans are still vague.

Poland has a hired house and garden in the country and a small Evkaf house in town which serves as an office. A site has been selected in the Chankaya district, but the transfer has not yet been effected. On it the Polish Government intends to erect a very large house. The plans contemplate providing seven or eight rooms to be used as guest rooms for travelling Poles.

Russia has a site on the Chankaya Road just below the Germans—not very large, perhaps about half the German site, at a guess. On it an enormous building is now almost completed, constructed entirely in reinforced concrete and of a most peculiar design. I am told that its internal arrangement is equally peculiar, consisting almost entirely of corridors and vast halls without any doors.

United States hire a small Evkaf house, where one of the secretaries always resides for a month at a time.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 7.

Report on Heads of Missions in Turkey.

(The portions in brackets are taken from the previous reports.)

(A.) CONSTANTINOPLE.

Austria: M. Auguste Kral. Fully accredited Minister.

(M. Kral reopened relations with Turkey in June after the interruption dictated in the peace treaties. He is a member of the old Austro-Hungarian consular service, and during the war was Civil Commissioner in Albania. He has been all his life in the Balkans and speaks Turkish and Albanian. His manner is characterised by an effusive and rather elaborate courtesy, but he is intelligent, well-informed, anxious to be on good terms with His Majesty's Mission, and perhaps even willing to be of service. He is married. 1924.)

Belgium: Baron de Villenfagne de Sorinnes. Fully accredited Minister.

(M. Michotte de Welle retired on pension in the summer and was replaced by M. Villenfagne, who is unmarried. He comes from China, Japan and Siam. In person he is short, fat and round, and he likes dancing with the tallest ladies. His disposition is jovial, and he can be amusing about Siam, but he is quite stupid. 1924.)

Bulgaria: M. Simeon Radev.

A Turco-Bulgarian Treaty has been signed, but not yet ratified.

M. Simeon Radev, having succeeded, after months of labour at Angora, in concluding a treaty with Turkey, left in October for Sofia to assume his duties as Bulgarian Minister at Washington. The mission is now in charge of M. Nicolas Nedev.

Czechoslovakia: Dr. R. Svetlik.

Treaty signed and ratified. Turkish Minister accredited to Prague, but no Czechoslovak Minister yet appointed to Turkey.

(The Czechoslovak representative, M. Svetlik, is married to a Miss Armstrong, of Australian origin. I know him but little, but he gives one the impression of being heavy and uninteresting. Most people describe him as a deadly bore. 1923.)

(M. Svetlik is a bore, and he is ponderous, but he is sufficiently well-read and well-educated not to be uninteresting. He has been appointed consul-general to Australia and is only awaiting the arrival of his successor (who will be a Minister Plenipotentiary, Czechoslovakia having signed a Treaty of Friendship with Turkey) to take his departure. Mme Svetlik greatly regrets the transfer, and perhaps, too, the reversion to a consular career after a taste of the diplomatic, in spite of the fact that she is going to her land of origin. She is really Irish (as M. Svetlik explains at length), and an Armstrong of Gallen, somewhere near Killarney. 1924.)

Denmark: M. Carl Ellis Wandel. Fully accredited Minister.

(M. Wandel lives almost entirely at Therapia, only coming in to Pera occasionally for a night or so. He has money of his own and very little work, so that he spends most of his time yachting and fishing. When his Government expressed the intention of suppressing the Legation here he offered to stay on as Minister without any pay. Nevertheless, he takes the rough with the smooth, and has just been to Angora to sign a Treaty of Friendship.

Mme. Wandel is a local lady of Jewish extraction. She is extremely handsome, well-read, and quite agreeable. 1924.)

Egypt: Mohammed Heddaya Pasha. Fully accredited Minister.

It was probably wise of the Egyptian Government to select as their representative a man who could not speak Turkish, as an Egyptian Turk in Constantinople or Angora would probably cease to represent Egyptian interests adequately. Heddaya Pasha, however, makes up for his deficiency by speaking fluently every other language of the Levant and Western Europe. I knew him of old in Egypt,

and we have a certain amount of business together. He is probably as loyal and straightforward as an Egyptian can be expected to be, and he certainly has no use for the Turks. His times were made bitter by the presence on his staff of a glittering little secretary named El Bialy Bey, who has now been recalled to Cairo and is in detention there under suspicion of complicity in the Stack murder. Heddaya is greatly relieved at having got rid of "that murderer," as he calls him.

The Egyptian Legation is located in a large palace in Nishantash. Heddaya Pasha shows no inclination to transfer himself to Angora.

France: M. Albert Sarraut. Fully accredited Ambassador.

M. Albert Sarraut arrived as French Ambassador in May 1925. He is 50 to 55 years of age, and has already greatly distinguished himself as Governor-General of Indo-China and as Minister of the Colonies. He told the Turks when he arrived that he had only come to Turkey to try to settle outstanding questions with them, and that if he could not succeed he would go straight back to politics in France; so it seems hardly likely that he will stay long in his present ungrateful position.

He is a meridional, gifted with all the exuberant eloquence of his race; when he gets started it is difficult for the other party to the conversation to do more than listen, and when excited his style is more forcible than elegant. He is fascinated by his own flow of language and inclined in talking to work up to a dramatic climax, which expresses a great deal more than he means. In conversation with Turks he likes to give them good advice, and criticises their methods of conducting their own affairs with such lucidity and dramatic point that he often gives offence, though he does not realise it. Nevertheless, with his wide experience of affairs and his undoubted intelligence and ability, it is well worth while hearing what he has to say about Turkey if care is taken to discount his utterances when he begins to be picturesque.

Fundamentally, he is very friendly to Great Britain, for he is convinced that the world is faced with a great struggle between the superior races trying to maintain civilisation and the inferior working for chaos. He welcomes the Locarno Treaty as a consolidation of the former, and considers that a close union of and co-operation between France and England is necessary to secure the victory.

As regards his dealings with the Turkish Government, his colony is beginning to whisper that he is another Franklin-Bouillon, and he has, indeed, spent by far the greater part of the last three months at Angora. Yet the reproach is unjust, for he has no illusions whatever as to the Turks, and if he has been courting them with officious assiduity, this is due to the present weakness of France rather than to self-deception or to any real personal predilection. Still, he has probably lost influence by being too assiduous.

With all his intelligence, he has few interests outside his work and little real cultivation. His idea of society is heavy chaff; his idea of fun, boisterous tomfoolery. I am afraid he is really a glorious vulgarian. It is wrong, of course, to be prejudiced by trifles, but necessary to record that he is the victim of a disgusting personal habit which several times in every conversation inspires his listeners with a feeling of physical nausea.

M. Sarraut is married and sometimes talks of his wife's coming to Turkey, but she does not seem likely to materialise. Meanwhile, his daughter keeps house for him; she is intelligent, good-looking and self-possessed and enjoys Angora, but, as she is only 18 years old, perhaps she does not know any better.

Germany: Herr Rudolf Nadolny. Fully accredited Ambassador.

(Herr Nadolny arrived in June, his last post having been at Stockholm, and reopened with Turkey as Minister Plenipotentiary the relations which had been interrupted during the armistice period and pending the conclusion of peace between Turkey and the Allies. He has the personal rank of Ambassador in the German service. The Embassy houses at Pera and Therapia have been reupholstered, repainted and redecorated, and a wooden transportable house of some twenty to twenty-five rooms has been erected at Angora. I have entered into relations with Herr Nadolny, and he has personally repeated to me the assurances, offered officially by Berlin to London, that Germany will not attempt to oppose in any way British policy in Turkey. I am unaware of any breach of these engagements, though, of course, in the commercial field the German merchant, doubtless with Herr Nadolny's help when required, makes great headway and leaves the British competitor far behind. To this no exception can be taken.

I do not think Herr Nadolny has any particularly good status with Turks, and there is a curious absence in the relations between the two countries of that comradeship which might have been expected to result from an alliance in war for four years. He has a good representative at Angora and is well informed on Turkish affairs, but I think that he is rather too sly to be regarded as really intelligent. Personally, he is too obsequious to be entirely agreeable, but I understand he can be arrogant enough to his colleagues from minor States. He has given one large *musicale* to Constantinople society, but he explained to all and sundry that it cost him nothing, because he got the artistes' services free in exchange for board and lodging. The French Embassy long refused to have any relations with the German mission, and induced the Belgian Minister (I think rather reluctantly) to follow suit, but at a party in this mission last night M. Jessé Curély allowed himself to be introduced to and to shake hands with Herr Nadolny.

Frau Nadolny is rather a forlorn figure, who never opens her mouth without saying "thank you." 1924.)

Hungary: M. Ladislas Tahy de Tahvar et Tarkeo. Fully accredited Minister.

(M. Tahy arrived in May 1924, and, like M. Kral, was formerly in the Austro-Hungarian consular service. He therefore speaks Turkish. In spite of his name, he is racially more a Slovak than a Magyar. During the war he was at Bagdad, and at one time, when there was no neutral consul there, he had to assume charge also of British interests. I have been in good relations with him, and he strikes me as being a very frank and straightforward man, perhaps with rather a hot temper. I do not believe he is anti-British any more than any of our ex-enemies might be expected to be so.

Mme. Tahy is an agreeable lady of pleasant appearance with a family of small children. 1924.)

Italy: M. Luca Orsini Baroni. Fully accredited Ambassador.

Signor Montagna was transferred in August to Rio—a disagreeable change to him, but not so disagreeable as it would have been if he had not realised that he was doing no good here. This fact doubtless accounted for the transfer. Indeed, Signor Montagna was too highly strung for Constantinople or Angora.

Signor Orsini Baroni arrived in October, and seems likely to be a pleasant and useful colleague, with whom I expect to collaborate agreeably. He has a nice sense of humour and is endowed with a patient and equable temper. He has the further advantage over his predecessor of not perpetually seeking personal successes.

Mme. Orsini Baroni is German by birth, and, as she is in mourning, we have barely made her acquaintance. She is tall and fair, and looks just like a heroic statue of Germania.

Japan: N. Y. Obata. Fully accredited Ambassador.

N. Obata presented his letters as Ambassador in November. He comes from China, where he has spent almost the whole of his career. I have seen very little of him so far. He and his wife both speak English haltingly.

Jugoslavia: M. Trajan Givkovitch. Delegate.

A treaty of friendship with Jugoslavia has been signed, but ratifications are not yet exchanged.

(M. Givkovitch has been in the Balkans all his life and speaks Turkish. In the virtual non-existence of any relations between Turkey and Jugoslavia, his post is mainly one of observation. He is well informed and quite intelligent.

Mme. Givkovitch is a worthy, plain woman from the Korsovo region. 1924.)

Netherlands: Baron W. B. R. de Welderen Rengers. Fully accredited Minister.

(Baron Rengers's last post was at Rome. Unlike the majority of one's diplomatic colleagues in Constantinople he bears the hall-mark of a diplomatist *de carrière*. He does not approve of Constantinople as a post. He is fond of wine, and after dinner can be very diverting. Owing to the Dutch Legation being in charge of Austrian interests he has a certain amount of work to do, otherwise most of his time is spent in frequenting places where he can get the opportunity of a drink or of seeing a pretty woman. 1923.)

(A lascivious fellow; a light weight. Mme. Rengers talks too much about her domestic difficulties. 1924.)

Persia: M. Sayyid Sadik Khan Tabatabai. Fully accredited Ambassador.

(Sadik Khan arrived in September and succeeded safely in presenting letters of credence as Ambassador at Angora. He is of unpleasing appearance, but possesses a sense of humour which would be still more appreciable if conversation did not have to be conducted through an interpreter. Unfortunately, the Sayyid, though understanding French, is too diffident to speak it. He is, I think, anxious to be on friendly relations with this mission and I have seen him several times; but I have had no serious business with him. 1924.)

Tabatabai is a good-natured fellow, who talks to me freely against Turk and Russian alike. But he really maintains a wobbly but Wilsonian impartiality of thought, the product of weakness rather than of conviction. He informs me that he is leaving Turkey for good in about a month's time, having been recalled at his own request, and that his mission is likely to be left under a Chargé d'Affaires for a considerable period of time.

Roumania: M. Georges Filality. Fully accredited Minister.

(M. Filality, the Roumanian Minister, was a colleague of mine at Nish during the war. He has been absent a good deal from his post and was employed in 1922 as Roumanian delegate in the negotiations with the Soviet at Warsaw. He is unmarried. He is short and round, with a keen sense of his own humour. He conceals much shrewdness beneath a jovial exterior, and his apparent bonhomie does not prevent him from being exceedingly caustic at the expense of others. 1923.)

(But M. Filality has appeared this winter with a tiny little wife and a tiny, but fully-grown daughter. 1924.)

Spain: M. Juan Servert y Vest. Fully accredited Minister.

(The Spanish Minister, M. Servert y Vest, is the doyen of the Ministers. He has spent most of his career in South America, and finds this climate somewhat trying. Owing to the difficulty of finding suitable accommodation in Constantinople itself, he lives rather an isolated life at Buyuk-Dere, where he spends the whole year. He is a quiet man of literary tastes. 1923.)

He goes in for photography, and reads a great deal, but unfortunately he has no memory at all.

Sweden: M. G. O. Wallenberg. Fully accredited Minister.

(M. Wallenberg realised on his arrival that he was under suspicion of having been very pro-German during the war. The fact that he is in charge of German interests here made it more difficult for him to get rid of this suspicion, but he works hard to dispel the legend that he is Germanophile. After the conclusion of the Prisoners' Exchange Agreement with the Angora Government some of the returned Turks did not hesitate to state in the Nationalist press that they had been badly treated at Malta and had suffered indignities there. M. Wallenberg procured a report from the Swedish consul at Malta on the treatment of the Turks. This report was very favourable to the British authorities, and M. Wallenberg lost no time in communicating it to the Turkish Government.

M. Wallenberg goes in greatly for Turkish society, and Turks are always to be found at his evening parties. In fact, he rather forces Turks on the notice of his Allied colleagues.

Mme. Wallenberg is a good-natured lady, who pours forth an unending stream of talk in a somewhat strident voice, which makes her a trying neighbour at dinner. 1922.)

He is quite ridiculously Turcophile.

United States of America: Rear-Admiral Mark L. Bristol.

Turco-American Treaty signed, but not ratified. Admiral Bristol has shown signs of desiring to divest himself of the appellation of High Commissioner, but it is not clear how he will wish to call himself in the increasingly embarrassing position in which he is placed, through the Senate's refusal to ratify.

(I think it a pity that the American Government have not long ago sent out a career diplomatist to take charge of the United States High Commission. I cannot bring myself altogether to trust Admiral Bristol.

Admiral Bristol and his wife entertain a great deal in a simple way. They are both devoted to dancing, and I am told are frequently to be seen at Maxim's and other similar places in this town. 1922.)

(Admiral Bristol has been here now for five years expecting most of the time to be replaced by a diplomat at any moment. At one time his successor had actually been designated and was packing up to come out here, when the arrangements were countermanded at the last moment. He himself, while anxious to get back to the navy, would also like to stay here till the Turco-American Treaty is ratified; he was recently offered the command of the United States fleet in Far Eastern waters.

In the little business I have had with Admiral Bristol he has proved friendly and helpful, and I doubt his being anti-British. He affects to be very strongly pro-Turkish, and pushes it to the point of never allowing himself to utter a remark derogatory to the Turks. This makes any reasonable discussion of current questions impossible, but, as he is not well-informed, it does not much matter. His attitude may be due to the excessive discretion usually observed by amateur diplomatists, or to the necessity of maintaining somehow a good standing with the Turks in spite of the anomalous relations between Turkey and America which compel him to continue calling himself High Commissioner. In this latter object he succeeds.

Admiral and Mrs. Bristol do a lot of entertaining. Till recently, at any rate, the Embassy was paid for from naval and not from State Department funds and was run like a ship. Filipino stewards do the waiting, a ship's steward buys the provisions and a ship's cook prepares them, all borne on the books of the U.S.S. "Scorpion." The result, though slightly strange at times, is nevertheless highly gratifying to Constantinople society in general, with whom Admiral and Mrs. Bristol are deservedly popular. 1924.)

Vatican: Mgr. Angelo Rotta. Apostolic delegate.

This prelate arrived in October, his last post having been in Guatemala. He is Bishop of Thebes *in partibus*. I have little acquaintance with him. The Turkish Government still do not recognise the existence of the Vatican, and Mgr. Rotta has no recognised official status at all.

(B.) Angora.

Afghanistan: Sultan Ahmed Khan. Fully accredited Minister.

(All I know is that Sultan Ahmed Khan is a brother-in-law of Mahmoud [?] Tarzi. His pay is much in arrears, and he longs for the fleshpots of Kabul; but his Government will neither pay him nor allow him to come away until the arrival of his successor, who is not yet even designated. 1924.)

I still have not made this gentleman's acquaintance and still have very little knowledge of him. He certainly *was* an Ambassador, and certainly *now is* a mere Minister. He is also something of a poet, and he speaks English. He lives like a Turk among the Turks, from whom he is almost indistinguishable and whose language he speaks well. He treats the Turkish officials with such deference that he is entirely useless to his own Government, who are dissatisfied with him and still intend to replace him. Meanwhile, he is still at Angora, in a house just outside the Temple of Augustus.

Greece: M. P. A. Argyropoulo. Fully accredited Minister.

M. Argyropoulo arrived as Minister in the early summer. He used to be Secretary-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and is a pleasant gentlemanly person, fairly intelligent but not conspicuously so. He lives, of course, at Angora.

Mme. Argyropoulo has accompanied her husband to Angora. She is remarkably inert, and told me she had not been outside her house more than once in the last five weeks. I don't blame her.

M. Jean Politis, who was Greek Chargé d'Affaires till the arrival of M. Argyropoulo, went back to Athens, but in September M. Exindaris, Greek representative on the Exchange Commission, fell foul of his Government, was recalled at twenty-four hours' notice, and M. Politis has taken his place. I fancy he also acts more or less in the capacity of a general political observer at Constantinople.

Poland: M. Roman Knoll. Fully accredited Minister.

(The Polish Legation is permanently at Angora, and only a delegation of it resides in Constantinople. At Angora they have two houses, one in town for the winter and a country house for the summer. I have only seen M. Knoll once or twice; he is young, intelligent, sensible, good-humoured, and determined to make

the best of the life he has to lead at Angora. Yet I fear he is not above stooping to the arts of the sycophant to gain credit with the Turks. 1924.)

It has for some time been said that M. Knoll is destined for more important employment elsewhere, perhaps in the Ministry at Warsaw. He is now on leave, and I hear he is likely not to return to Angora. The Legation is in charge of M. Schwarzbourg Gunther, who is friendly and intelligent, with a particularly agreeable wife who has spent most of the year at Angora.

Russia: M. Suritz. Fully accredited Ambassador.

M. Suritz is a suave, plump person of 50 to 55 years of age, with black hair and a white face. I have made his acquaintance and come across him three or four times. He loves to be spoken to. He may or may not be a Jew, but he was born at Dvinsk, which is suspicious. He got into trouble with the Imperial authorities in the disturbances of 1905–6, and in consequence spent three years in Siberia on the shores of the Arctic Ocean at a place where the thermometer in winter used to register 50 degrees of frost Réaumur! After that he settled at Kiev and did statistical work, in the course of which he became acquainted with Trotski, to whose chariot wheels he attached himself. He was Soviet Minister in Afghanistan before coming to Turkey. He entertains Turkish Deputies very freely at Angora, with lashers of strong liquor, but he himself suffers from ill-health and is never seen to eat or drink anything at all. The Russian Mission enjoys great influence with the Turkish Government, but it is usually said here that its real brains are to be found in the head of Comrade Potemkin, Russian consul-general at Constantinople, rather than in that of the Ambassador.

[**E 225/107/44**] No. 8.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received January* 11.)

No. 5.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January* 6, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 302 of the 14th April last, I have the honour to enclose the text, as given in the local press, of the recently concluded Turco-Serbian Treaty which was ratified by the Angora Assembly on the 31st ultimo.

2. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ministers at Belgrade, Sofia and Athens.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 8.

Extract from the "Stamboul" of January 1, 1926.

(Translation of Turkish text of Turco-Serbian Treaty ratified at Angora on December 31, 1925.)

D'UNE part, la République de Turquie et, d'autre part, le Royaume des Serbes-Croates-Slovènes,

Désireux de mettre fin à l'état de guerre créé à la date du 29 octobre 1914 entre l'Empire ottoman et la Serbie, et d'établir et de renforcer des liens réciproques d'une sincère amitié entre les deux pays; convaincus également que la reprise des relations entre les deux États contribuera à assurer le bien-être et le bonheur de leurs peuples respectifs,

Ont décidé de conclure un traité de paix et d'amitié et ont désigné à cet effet comme délégués:

Le Président de la République de Turquie: Tewfik Kiamil Bey, Sous-Secrétaire d'État au Ministère des Affaires étrangères; et

Sa Majesté le Roi des Serbes-Croates-Slovènes: M. Trajan Gifkovitch.

Après vérification et échange de leurs pouvoirs, les susdits délégués ont arrêté ce qui suit:

Article 1er.

Une paix stable et une amitié sincère et durable existeront entre la République de Turquie et le Royaume des Serbes-Croates-Slovènes.

ARTICLE 2

Les hautes parties contractantes se sont mises d'accord pour établissement entre les deux États limitrophes conformément aux principes du droit international l'existence de relations particulières de chacune des parties contractantes avec le territoire de l'autre partie et réservent réciproquement la faculté d'exercer leurs intérêts internationaux

ARTICLE 3

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les textes ratifiés seront échangés à Belgrade dès que faire se pourra

Le présent traité entrera en vigueur quinze jours après l'échange des ratifications et restera en vigueur pendant dix années

Sa Majesté le Padishah et Son Excellence le Président de la République de Turquie se réservent de renouveler d'un commun accord ce traité

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs cachets

Fait en double exemplaire à Angora, le 17 mars 1925

TEWFIK KIAMIL GHEORGHE

No 9

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received April 16)

No 4
(Telegraph)

Pera, January 16, 1926

VIENNA telegram No 23 of 15th March 1924 must be taken into consideration with all measures which may be taken in future in the matter of reduced export of arms to Turkey

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E 536 59 44 No 10

Sir P. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain — Received January 21

(No 24 Confidential)

Sir *Constantinople, January 6, 1926*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith some notes on political matters made by Mr Henderson during his recent visit to Angora

2 The paragraphs on Sükri Bey's mission are of particular interest as they give a first glimpse of what preparing to take shape. Of course it would be unwise to attach too much importance to the language of Sükri when addressing the *Ghazi* and still more to assume that the plans envisaged, but in Constantinople we often gather some impression of the present régime Turkey is a cross-grained people, and we have some confirmation of the Ghazi's intimate entourage Reference to possible internal events excites apprehension for the moral and the health of the President, the President is the régime and it is widely felt that neither can last very much longer What is likely to follow is a catastrophe is just a conjecture but there are many shrewd people who share Sükri's view that to-morrow is Doomsday

3 I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Baghdad

I have &c
R C LINDSAY

Enclosure in No. 10

Memorandum by Mr. Henderson

DURING my six days stay at Angora in connection with the site and house question I had many talks with Sükri Bey, to which the house at present occupied by the Embassy was not confined to the house question On two occasions—about two hours one morning at his house and again on the 6th instant when I dined with him at the Ghazi's—he grew quite expansive, on the second occasion probably as a result of a few cocktails supplied by *Monsieur* Nor the first part I refrained from asking questions, but merely let him talk

Sükri Bey is a year younger than the Ghazi (49). The two grew up together and entered the army at the same time They were together in Tripoli and again during the general war I was shown many old photographs of the two together During the Nationalist movement and the fighting which followed Sükri was the Ghazi's right-hand man He was Deputy for Broussa Yozgad, and generally admitted to be in the inner circle at Constantinople

We first got away from the house question, which I had been pressed to reconsider in succession to accept rent for the temporary occupation of the house by your Excellency, and I began by saying that we were always pleased to show kindness where possible, as he never knew when it might be returned He himself had a strong affection for Angora and down to the sticking to it of the Ghazi through the whole long war had come out on top He owed everything to the Ghazi, but that we got to single presidents, &c., while the sultanates were temporary kingdoms, republics are everything Europe had been brought up to fear Abdul Hamid but the Sultans were gone Today Turkey has Mustafa Kemal, who, except that no one knows what changes tomorrow might bring The Turkish people were absolutely secure if the Ghazi lived another fifteen years with a single stroke that he did not think this moment He was however in such a jolly humour We were talking as friends, &c

Two days later I visited Sükri to hear that we had spent a previous evening with the Ghazi He had stopped me when he passed and if the Ghazi was asleep "he went to his bedroom and kissed him awake" They were generally found there in the evenings They had driven the Ghazi back to *Dolma Bagtche* and played games in order to get a good night's sleep but they always had a good time Sometimes they visited Moscow Art Theatre, but it was all the same, as the pieces generally started about 3 A.M., and always ended very early

The Ghazi was very lucky He could never sleep in a room, even a tent, on the first night If this was the case he went on that very night to a tent (Yoruk encampment west of Angora) He was also subject to fits of depression One he told Sükri that he thought he was going to die, and, as all that he could do was to go to the People's party, At this Sükri said he wept and "begged him not to do it, for the moment the Ghazi goes I know that they will anglicise Once the Ghazi dies there will be complete anarchy and I know not what will happen" Several times in recent months the Ghazi has asked him if he were afraid, but he Sükri had invariably replied "No, my Pasha, I will follow you always to whatever you do or say"

At times the Ghazi got very dissatisfied with the manner of existence He was naturally a bright, cheerful disposition, and liked company He hated being cooped up at Ankara often complaining that all the others could go to Constantinople and Europe as they liked while they were practically arrested by armed guards The most he could do was to make short tours Yalova on one occasion he got no pleasure Sükri was going to accompany him to Adana after the latter's tour—to Konia, Aksehir and Afiun Karahissar

The Ghazi was terribly overworked Turkey to-day, he said, was Turkey The Ministers were devils as he told them When even the most unimportant matter came before the Cabinet they at once took it to him, and as well it was All the revolutionary steps taken in recent years had been the subject of the Ghazi's study He thought it all out beforehand and then quickly made his decision The greatest step of all was the Ankara Congress, to which he had to go by train, his speech in Kastamuni (his train was chosen as it was the centre of the then opposition area) and the Cabinet was set to carry it out effect

One more point Sükri Bey's talks touched upon was the Ghazi's health He had a few serious illnesses, to which I replied that I had been told the Ghazi said, "Well I see, now what are you proposing to do now" Sükri said he thought of building a new house on his old site and used the remark to me "I advise you not to say anything of the sort to anyone at all" Sükri told me that, in view of the serious illness of the Ghazi, he thought it resulting in one of the Evkaf houses in town

I have given Sükri's statements as accurately as I can recall them, and refrain from making any suggestions thereon, however, state that his remarks about casting

bread upon the waters was made at the moment when he was very desirous that we should accept his hospitality while everything else reported above was said in the last two days of my visit to Ankara I decided to accept rent

In the evening at Fresco's I met Jevat Musat Bey who was formerly Chamberlain to the Caliph He speaks English very well He was just been appointed Inspector General at New York We were only able to talk for a few minutes, and I remarked to him on the progress I had noticed in Angora He admitted that there had been progress but added that he meant the progress as only of a few who have the means to live Of what about the thousands I may say I could see the miserable conditions in which they live? Now Angora is a place to an official of the Porte very glad to be leaving it to-morrow

I had a long talk with M Yenake the agent for Adzeran a Company who is doing a lot of work at Angora He is engaged in the construction of the Ghazi's farm He said that he saw the Ghazi very often and liked him He was however very difficult at times—probably after drinking bouts of which he showed signs—and took quite elaborate notes of the things he had to be charged Some buildings had to be pulled down and others, as the Ghazi sometimes would for him M Yenake to make a free translation to Mustafa Kemal Pasha of what he had to be extremely rude When orders for improvements had been received the Ghazi used to ask the people what it would cost him and when all the items of these were made up the deductions were often curious

Soon after parliament met the question of the Ankara water supply became urgent, and M Yenake was asked to submit a scheme for reservoirs He estimated for a reservoir measuring 100 by 100 yards, but the Ghazi thought it should be enlarged A lake on the east was also suggested, and Chankaya Park was finally decided on as the site for the reservoir, which was to be shaped like Lake Leman The water was to be conducted to Europe "Let us have a lake at Ankara" M Yenake has accordingly prepared a plan for a reservoir to that scale The estimated cost was £ 10,000, but this was reduced by £ 2,000 by the sacrifice of the Gulf Island, and the Marmora Lake is to be shown, as the Gulf Island, all to scale properly oriented, and measuring roughly 40 by 4 metres is now almost completed with little jetties at all the principal Marmora ports'

The Ghazi's latest whim is to have billiard tables in a room in the first storey at Cankaya M Yenake points out that the work is not satisfactory as the floor already sags at least 3 cm and the walls are not cracked but he has orders to get it done Large cheques disappear at Ankara' M Yenake stated that the Ghazi had spoken to him of the construction of a new kiosk—he thought quite close to the present one

Nobody seemed inclined to talk to me about Mosul though there was no doubt about the curiosity of all the officials with whom I spoke as to when your Excellency was likely to arrive Mr. Trost, the American delegate, said he thought they were curious, but passive, while others told me that the possibility of war could be ruled out I heard that the Government was getting into serious financial straits and that some people, *e.g.*, Saad Bey, were making the most of present opportunities.

There is apparently an official order in force at Angora that Constantinople shall now be known as Stamboul Telegrams would only be accepted if so addressed, and in spite of my protests, the telegraph clerks insisted on changing the name in the body of every telegram.

A K HELM

January 18, 1926.

No 11

Sir R Lindsay (Constantinople) to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

(No 10)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office January* 26 1926

YOUR telegram No 3 (Turkish Affairs) Turkish preparations in the Straits

Admiralty desire to receive full report as soon as possible Please telegraph information at present available as also of the later final report

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E 708 708 44] No 12

Mr Lester (Sofia) to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received February 1)

(No 17
Sir, *Sofia, January* 28 1926.

With reference to my despatch No 244 of the 21st November, I have the honour to report that I passed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs today when he expected that the Graeco Bulgarian Treaty would be presented to the Sobranje for ratification.

2 M Burov showed some reserve in his reply He said he had not yet had time to consider the question, but he had before him to discuss it with his colleagues at the Council He admitted that there was some opposition to the Thracian circles based largely on the exaggerated estimate on the part of the refugees of the value of the property which they had abandoned in Eastern Thrace

3 Though the policy of the Government has got to the press, I understand that the Macedonian Committee are carrying on an active campaign among the refugees against the treaty and that a large number of meetings of protest have been held in the provinces As M Burov laid emphasis on his desire to re-establish normal relations with Turkey in order to open an outlet where he had formerly absorbed the greater part of Bulgaria's surplus products both agricultural and industrial it is clear that the opposition is of a formidable nature and is causing the Bulgarian Government some embarrassment

4 The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires recently informed one of my colleagues that he had made serious representations to the Bulgarian Government against the treaty, saying that the Turkish Government were ready to submit for ratification to the Angora Parliament at once but that the treaty would not be so ratified by the Bulgarian Government

5 I enclose a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora

I have &c.

WILLIAM ERSKINE.

No 13

Sir R Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received February 4)

(No 12)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople February* 3 1926

I visited Smyrna on Wednesday, and had interviews with Turkish Government Apostolic Delegate and Italian Consul General who has just been at Angora returned this afternoon from his engagement which was gala'd, and took leave of Turkish Vatican as it may be called Each of these gentlemen told me that as regards French protectorate Catholic establishments Ismid Smyrna and Ankara were not rendered. The churches are in their same form, and this would be a great consequence for which may have been taken

No. 14

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Chamberlain (Received February 4, 1926)

No. 13)
Telegraphic
YOUR telegram No. 12

I have spoken to Mr. Kellogg on the lines of your telegram and he has promised to send a telegram to Mr. Coolidge to-day. I am to see Mr. Kellogg again to-morrow and I will then telegraph to you the substance of the telegram which Mr. Kellogg will send to Mr. Coolidge.

Mr. Kellogg thinks that Mr. Coolidge will be back in Washington next week. I will see Mr. Kellogg as soon as Mr. Coolidge returns to Washington and will report to you by telegraph the substance of the telegram which Mr. Kellogg will send to Mr. Coolidge.

E 896 703 65

No. 15

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Chamberlain (Received February 5)

No. 69

I have spoken to Mr. Kellogg on the lines of your telegram No. 12 of the 2nd February to the effect that His Majesty's Government would be glad to see a friendly settlement of the Tacna-Arica question and would be prepared to offer their good offices to that end if they could be of any assistance. Mr. Kellogg said that he was grateful for the offer of His Majesty's Government and that he would be glad to accept it. He would, however, like to consult Mr. Coolidge before doing so. Mr. Coolidge is expected back in Washington next week and Mr. Kellogg will then let me know what decision has been arrived at.

2. Mr. Kellogg has not yet received any report from Peru as to the present situation, but he has received a telegram from the United States Ambassador at Santiago to the effect that the Chilian Government are willing to accept the offer of the United States Government to submit the Tacna-Arica question to arbitration. Mr. Kellogg said that he was not sure whether the Chilian Government would be willing to submit the whole question to arbitration or only certain points in connection with it. He thought that the Chilian Government would probably be willing to submit the question of the plebiscite to arbitration. He said that he was not sure whether the Chilian Government would be willing to submit the question of the boundaries to arbitration. He thought that the Chilian Government would probably be willing to submit the question of the boundaries to arbitration.

E 1072 373 44

No. 16

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Chamberlain (Received February 8)

(No. 79)

I have spoken to Mr. Kellogg on the lines of your telegram No. 12 of the 2nd February to the effect that His Majesty's Government would be glad to see a friendly settlement of the Tacna-Arica question and would be prepared to offer their good offices to that end if they could be of any assistance. Mr. Kellogg said that he was grateful for the offer of His Majesty's Government and that he would be glad to accept it. He would, however, like to consult Mr. Coolidge before doing so. Mr. Coolidge is expected back in Washington next week and Mr. Kellogg will then let me know what decision has been arrived at.

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7. I do not think that the Government will be disposed to take any steps to enforce the payment of the amounts due to the Ottoman Public Debt, the existence of which they have always denied, and which they have been asked to recognise on more than one occasion.

8. I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 61

Constantinople, February 10, 1926.

IN my despatch No. 36 of the 5th instant, which I described the manner in which British subjects are suffering from the present wave of Turkish nationalist hatred of all things foreign, I dealt with the case of the High School for Girls, Constantinople.

2. I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of the Board, a copy of the Turkish letter of the 24th February, 1923. They are briefly as follows:—

(1) No schools are to be established, or schools, as regards—

(a) Taxation,
(b) Public order,
(c) Laws and regulations,

(2) The Turkish Government shall not take into consideration the question of the education of, and the provincial organisation of the Turkish subjects in these schools.

3. Ever since the Angora Government took over Constantinople the English High School for Girls has been the subject of discussion, in order to meet the wishes of the Turkish Government as much as possible, and to conform with the regulations which, in reference to buildings, have gradually been more clearly defined. They have already changed the whole character of the school, and it is not to be expected that they will ever let it out of existence. The specific points are:—

(a) Increase of Turkish pupils:

	Turkish pupils	Others.
October 1, 1923, to June 30, 1924	2	4
September 1, 1924, to June 30, 1925	4–5	6
September, 1925	12	8

It is not the intention to exclude Turkish girls, but to put Turkish on a footing with English. What is feared is that the Turkish pupils, who are largely Moslem, will not be willing to attend Christian classes, and the classes have to be reorganised throughout. The foundation

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E 1073/373/44 No. 7

Sir R. Lindsay (Sir Austen Chamberlain) (*Received February 15*)

No. 61

Constantinople, February 10, 1926.

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...ges whether the use of the school as a training ground for girls in order to learn English [illegible] whether under present circumstances of the Turkish people to take [illegible] to the control this side of school work, which [illegible] means to this end, the English character of the school, and the way it will be managed.

The English Girls' School has always enjoyed the confidence of the Turkish authorities and the fees of pupils are paid by them. The result has been a most satisfactory one. It is noted that the Turkish Government has not [illegible] the school [illegible] to be very grateful for [illegible] the English school [illegible] to the Turkish people. Such [illegible] the Turkish authorities [illegible] the Turkish Government [illegible] the Turkish people [illegible] the Turkish Government [illegible] the Turkish people [illegible] the Turkish Government [illegible] the Turkish people

fonctionnaires [illegible] Passih Bey, other than a retraite [illegible] have the requirements [illegible] experience or profession [illegible] a strict trade [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[E 928 228 65] No 21

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R Lindsay (Constantinople)

(No 47)

Sir *Foreign Office, February 27, 1926*

AN increasing number of protests against the treatment accorded to the Christian minorities in Turkey and appeals on their behalf for assistance from His Majesty's Government are being received in this Department and there are indications which seem to show that a general campaign may shortly be organized in this country with the object of inducing His Majesty's Government to intervene on behalf of these minorities with the League of Nations. The majority of these protests refer to the treatment of the Assyrian Christians. The accompanying copies of correspondence exchanged between the Archbishop of Canterbury and His Majesty's Diplomatic Representatives show that the Archbishop would press for the immediate consideration of the Assyrian question by the Council of the League of Nations. You will also observe from the despatch from Sofia and the despatch to Vienna noted in the margin that His Majesty's Government have taken steps to ascertain what the attitude of the Turkish Government is likely to be in this connection.

2. You already will recollect that the question of the treatment of the Christian minorities in Turkey was raised in the House of Commons on the 20th March last, and in reply to a question addressed to me on that occasion I stated that His Majesty's Government were fully conscious of the importance of the question, and that they would not fail to take any opportunity which might present itself of dealing with it. I added, however, that I was not sanguine as to the possibility of bringing the matter before the Council of the League of Nations at the present time, and that I thought it desirable to avoid anything which might tend to increase the difficulties of the situation.

3. You will recollect that in the course of the discussion which took place in the House of Commons on the 20th March last, Mr Ponsonby asked me whether I could state what was the present position of the Assyrian question, and whether any steps were being taken to bring it before the League of Nations. I replied that the matter was under consideration, but that I was not prepared to make any statement at that moment. I added that I was fully aware of the importance of the question, and that I would not fail to take any opportunity which might present itself of dealing with it. I also stated that I was not sanguine as to the possibility of bringing the matter before the Council of the League of Nations at the present time, and that I thought it desirable to avoid anything which might tend to increase the difficulties of the situation.

4. You will also recollect that in the course of the discussion which took place in the House of Commons on the 20th March last, Mr Ponsonby asked me whether I could state what was the present position of the Assyrian question, and whether any steps were being taken to bring it before the League of Nations. I replied that the matter was under consideration, but that I was not prepared to make any statement at that moment. I added that I was fully aware of the importance of the question, and that I would not fail to take any opportunity which might present itself of dealing with it. I also stated that I was not sanguine as to the possibility of bringing the matter before the Council of the League of Nations at the present time, and that I thought it desirable to avoid anything which might tend to increase the difficulties of the situation.

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68. You will also recollect that in the course of the discussion which took place in the House of Commons on the 20th March

aircraft visiting Turkey and after consultation with other Governments interested, I am of opinion that certain of these regulations are contrary to international practice or to the provisions of the Straits Convention.

2. It would be seen that these regulations extend a certain distance from the coast of Turkey and include aircraft in the region of Amasra, Samsun and Trebizond to fly over the sea within 20 kilometres of the coast. Your Excellency will recollect that in the 10th paragraph of my despatch No. 650 of the 4th July last addressed to Turkish Ambassador, that His Majesty's Government are unable to recognise any claim to exercise over the 3 mile limit of territorial waters beyond that which is recognised by international law. I shall be glad if you will now inform the Turkish Government that it is His Majesty's Government's intention to refuse to admit any claim on the part of Turkey to regard the Turkish claim to jurisdiction beyond the 3 mile limit as being without foundation.

3. With regard to the provisions of the Straits Convention the Turkish regulations seem to me to be contrary to them in the following respects:

(a) In establishment of a prohibited area in the Marmora area. The Marmora coast consists of the Chatalja zone. This is contrary to Article 2 of the Straits Convention, which recognises the principle of the freedom of the air over the whole of the Sea of Marmora. It would even seem that the area of the prohibited zone of land encroaches unduly on the three waters of the Straits.

(b) In prescribing as part of the area to which the Dardanelles Sea of Marmora or Bosphorus. In this respect the Turkish Government seem to be exceeding their powers as the foreign navigation of these zones is secured by the Straits Convention. Moreover, the Turkish regulations seem to limit navigation in these areas to the waters of the Straits whereas article 10 of the Convention allows aircraft freedom to fly over a strip of territory 10 kilometres wide on each side of the new parts of the Straits.

(c) In prescribing that foreign aircraft with their assistance and at San Stefano for customs sanitary and other purposes for the establishment of an entity or any other purpose. This, so far as concerns military aircraft passing through the Straits is contrary to section 1 (c) of the annex to article 2 of the Straits Convention.

(d) In prescribing that foreign non-military aircraft without exception entering the territories of Turkey should first carry out their photographs of war material &c. This regulation, under section 1 (b) of the annex to article 2 of the Straits Convention, could be applied to aircraft in transit through the Straits.

(e) In omitting to recognise in the regulations that in virtue of section 1 (c) of the annex to the Straits Convention aircraft possess the right of a forced landing on the coast or in the sea of territorial waters of Turkey.

4. So far as is necessary to deal with the Turkish regulations, the regulations provide that customs officers accompanying the Turkish aircraft must obtain authority through the diplomatic channel. I suggest that we should use with the Turkish delegate to the Straits Commission at Paris the language which the commission in connection with article 4 of the Straits Convention, the composition of the Turkish regulations and the suggestions of the Straits Convention.

5. In so far as foreign aircraft are concerned, I shall be glad if your Excellency will instruct the Chargé d'Affaires to make representations to the Turkish Government at once.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

E 1385 226 44 No. 9

Sir H. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain *Received March 1.*

No. 89.

Sir, *Constantinople, February 24, 1926.*

It was not to be expected that the Turkish press, at its present servility, would do otherwise than welcome the agreement which I have the honour to inform you in my telegram No. 77 of the 22nd instant M. de Jouvenel has just concluded. But I think that both the Government (who have great need of some success in foreign policy) and most part of the people think at all are genuinely relieved to have come to terms with France. The interview which M. de Jouvenel had with yourself had of course been reported as foreshadowing a pact of non-aggression against Turkey. The press, therefore, cannot refrain from expressing its delight at finding that France is not united to Great Britain's apron-strings, and that she is not being forced by Great Britain into a policy of isolating Turkey. M. de Jouvenel, on his part, has taken an opportunity of declaring to the editor of the "Republique" the true nature of his conversations with your Lordship and his language is so loyal that I attach the newspaper extract which gives it.*

The Turkish press therefore finds that nothing now divides France and Turkey except the coupons question, and, if they only approach Turkey with the same sympathy as the French will have no more difficulty in settling that problem than they had in negotiating the present agreement. The whole press recognises that the new agreement is the natural sequel of the Kemalist Pact of Convention, but wisely refrains from suggesting that the hitherto uncompromising attitude of the Turkish Government has had anything to do with the views of Italy's settling the Syrian frontier. The feeling that Russia is wishing to Western Europe is no doubt made the Turks more easy for M. de Jouvenel to deal with. However, a report of that very non-aggression pact which seems to raise at once the hopes from Russia, fewth Russia Bolshevik agitation, on the eve of signing a agreement with M. de Jouvenel, to telegraphic sincere and states of M. Chicherin, who responded the same day. First, one appreciates that Great Britain and Russia now glad to come to terms with Turkey are trying to compromise between which negotiations can be conducted with Turkey only she is approached with understanding, sympathy and goodwill the press in general as I think, of Great Britain in mind.

I have, &c.
H. C. LINDSAY

E 1386 202 44 No. 26.

Sir H. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain *(Received March 1.)*

No. 81.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 15, 1926.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 17th instant the National Assembly at Angora was the scene of a remarkable legislative event when the new Civil Code, consisting of 1,915 articles, was passed without amendment and without any thing but laudatory comment in the course of a single short sitting. It is current rumoured that its appearance in the Turkish courses to begin as from this date. No sooner M. Heri de Jouvenel who was resent on this historic occasion, with his thinking of the French Chambers travel over the budget, perhaps this long-awaited exercised to an interview that the Ministers of Europe have much to learn from that of Turkey.

2. The new code is more than based upon, is practically a literal translation of the Swiss Civil Code. Certain alterations, generally of an unimportant character, have been introduced but it can already be said that the new code introduces monogamy, trusts, marriage and divorce to secular instead of religious authorities, and puts the Turkish woman on an equality with the Turkish man, besides completely altering the law of inheritance. It is also a matter that sanctions have been introduced the declaration Turk shows himself. The marriage of a Moslem woman to a Christian man is declared to be illegal.

3. The old code which this replaced was promulgated in 1869 and was a belated product of the reforms which began a hundred years ago. It was a compromise between Mosleh law and the Code Napoleon. As such it was most unsatisfactory so far as European interests were concerned. It was unsuited to modern business and to Western private life and it was full of inconsistencies. On the other hand it had for the Turk the important merit of safeguarding the principles of the sacred law.

* Not printed.

4. The step just taken by the Turkish Government is therefore a bold one, and the Government is well aware of it. Its spokesmen admit that they are breaking with the tradition of thirteen hundred years. But they say that the recent revolution was to be completed and bear its fruit, the fetters of the old code had to be broken off from Turkish life. The private life of the Turks is therefore to be regulated not by Moslem law, which has present rulers regard as the main cause of its backwardness, but by the same sort of law as runs in every civilised land. The adoption of the new code is therefore part and parcel of Mustafa Kemal Pasa's policy of Western nationalism.

5. Had the country been free to express its feelings, there would undoubtedly have been disturbances, for of these is one thing which will move the Turk of the old school it is that the light that the sacred law is in danger. But once the parliamentary Ahead Commission had finished with the Bill, the Government allowed no chance for any kind of criticism. It was introduced before the Assembly by the Minister of Justice, two other speakers pledged to it did not speak without a word of discussion. Devoted Deputies, to whom at most the amendments were communicated, of its acceptance by the light of the electric bulbs outside and over the eagle eye of the Ghazi in his box.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

[E 1454 34 44] No. 27

Exchange of Notes between the German and Turkish Governments respecting a Provisional Commercial Treaty.

Communicated by Privy Councillor Rauscher, Berlin, February 26. Received March 2, 1926.

(1)

M. Nadolny to Turkish Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Ambassade d'Allemagne, Angora, le 13 décembre 1925.

A. le Ministre

M. le Ministre, à nos récents entretiens concernant le *modus vivendi* pour les relations commerciales entre la Turquie et l'Allemagne et en réponse à la note que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de vous communiquer qu'en attendant la conclusion du Traité de Commerce et cours de négociations, mon Gouvernement est d'accord pour appliquer l'Arrangement provisoire suivant:

1. Le Gouvernement turc consent à ce que les produits du sol et de l'industrie originaires d'Allemagne, importés sur le territoire turc et destinés soit à la consommation, soit à la réexportation ou au transit jouissent du traitement prévu par la Convention commerciale conclue à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923, pour les produits des États qui sont signée.

2. Il est entendu que l'application de ce régime est subordonnée à l'application en Allemagne aux produits du sol et de l'industrie originaires de Turquie, du traitement de la nation la plus favorisée.

3. Le droit douanier allemand sur les raisins secs (position 32 du tarif douanier allemand) sera celui du Traité commercial entre l'Allemagne et l'Espagne expiré le 10 octobre 1925, c'est-à-dire 8 marks par quintal (100 kilog.).

4. L'application du droit douanier prévu par l'article précédent aura effet rétroactif à partir du 17 octobre 1925.

5. Le présent accord expirera avec l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Commerce définitif. Cependant les deux Gouvernements se réservent le reprendre, le cas échéant, leur liberté d'action moyennant avertissement six mois à l'avance.

6. Le présent accord sera ratifié par le Reichstag allemand et entrera en vigueur sept jours après sa notification de la ratification par le Gouvernement allemand au Gouvernement turc.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères par intérim:

MAHMUT ESSAD

(2)

Turkish Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Nadolny.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Angora, le 13 décembre 1925.*

M. le Ministre, référant à nos récents entretiens concernant le *modus vivendi* pour les relations commerciales entre la Turquie et l'Allemagne et en réponse à la note que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de vous communiquer qu'en attendant la conclusion du Traité de Commerce et cours de négociations, mon Gouvernement est d'accord pour appliquer l'Arrangement provisoire suivant:

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Veuillez agréer, &c.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères par intérim:

MAHMUT ESSAD

No. 28

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received March 4, 4.30 p.m.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 4, 1926.*

My despatch No. 59: Turkish anti-foreign activities.

Since date of my despatch No. 91 these have become more numerous and more systematic.

Last night two British nationals were delivered of British institutions.

In both cases communication was made verbally only.

1. One English girls school which has been told that it must within twenty-four hours accept Turkish terms (see my despatch No. 61) during which it will be closed immediately. This summons can only be regarded as reply to my note of 9th February. School committee is meeting today and will almost certainly decide to refuse demand and face the consequences a decision which I think is the right one.

2. Ottoman Bank has been required under threat of being closed to promise to engage eventually fifty Mussalman Turkish employees. Of these it must take ten within twenty-four hours. These ten are to be nominated by Turkish authorities, who will fix their salaries etc. who admittedly will know nothing of work they have to do. Bank manager has decided to refuse and presumably he will close immediately. He is quite alive to his risks.

I shall make representations to the delegation during and protest strongly but as delegate has no authority it seems that my action will be of no immediate use.

Situation is distinctly serious. Great Britain has abandoned Capitulations in exchange for a resistance convention and latter is practically a dead letter. It is no use for Turks to profess anxiety to settle Mosul question and establish good political relations if at the same time they are resolved on squeezing out British institutions.

[illegible] commercial activities and it seems desirable to pursue Mosul negotiations while these tendencies exist prevalent

[illegible] I recommend that you order me now to proceed to Angora at once I should refuse for the time being to discuss Mosul at all but should protest against Turkish violation of engagements point to consequences of their action and enquire what they intend to do with regard to these questions of future of Anglo Turkish relations However the still more aggressive if we were able to say that you had summoned me for consultation though I should have to make it clear that this did not mean any change towards breaking off diplomatic relations.

Further despatch on the [illegible] arrived on 7th March but it was sent before these developments took place

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No 29

Sir R Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain Received March 5

(No 26)
Telegraphic *Constantinople March 4 1926*

MY telegram No 25

If this I should get Angora before proceeding to Smyrna I should start on 7th March and hope to return to Constantinople immediately to London where I should arrive 14th or 15th March Any further delay would make no difference to you

There is still time for you to stop me from going to Angora if you answer very urgently

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No 30

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R Lindsay (Constantinople)

(No 23)
Telegraphic *Foreign Office March 5 1926*

Your Telegram No 26 of 4th March Proposed visit to Angora

Turkish attitude is reported in your telegram No 25 of 4th March certainly calls for strong representations and your presence at Angora for this purpose is to be welcomed. On the other hand the most effective way of action in this matter to protect British interests regarding work from [illegible] to withdraw. With this caveat I feel sure that you will return to Angora and I approve your proposed return thereto this country

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No 31

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R Lindsay (Constantinople)

(No 24)
Telegraphic *Foreign Office March 5 1926*

MY telegram No 23 of 5th March Visit to Angora

Smyrna Aidin Railway have informed me of recent attitude by Turkish authorities in insisting on substitution of Turks for certain foreign staff

In view of standing of company you should in future base your representations as you make regarding grievances of

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E 1571 373 44] No 32

Sir R Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received March 8)

(No 91)
Sir *Constantinople March 3 1926*

In my despatches No 50 of 8th February and No 65 of 10th February I dealt at some length with the recent wave of nationalism in Turkey and its effect upon the interests of British residents here Nearly a month has passed since that time during which I have been making a careful note of all complaints reaching me from

different quarters and I regret to say that I can observe little or no sign of improvement On the contrary fresh complaints have been brought to my notice almost daily and I have been compelled [illegible] to advise the delegate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with notes of protest in all cases where there has been an undoubted violation of the Treaty of Lausanne

2 I shall begin this record with nothing to say as regards the action on the part of our present rulers In the first place after the recent ill digested Bills we have to be prepared for important changes during which the new Civil Code has been presented and passed by the Assembly Of the various draft laws to which I referred in my despatches for reference the most objectionable are, providing for the appointment of [illegible] assessors to the boards of Turkish and foreign companies has been so roughly handled by the commission of the Assembly that I trust it will never emerge in a recognisable shape

3 Another law which was also being aimed at foreign companies seems for the moment to have been successfully parried Not long ago there were indications that foreign firms whose major operations were conducted in Turkey were inspired by the Smyrna Resident Conference to be called upon to register as Turkish companies Several Smyrna firms which were being threatened at the time of my last despatch have succeeded in arranging matters satisfactorily with the Turkish authorities and the leading British firms here are also easier on this score

4 It is however only right to the picture Minor interferences with British firms books and ships have been worse than ever and the police have been peculiarly unpleasant of late [illegible] I will not burden you, Sir with instances, but I give you a typical picture of the way the authorities go about their business I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of an interview between Mr Wyatt the manager of the London Bank and a Turkish head calling to see the Inspector for Foreign Companies [illegible] subject of re-[illegible] Master Turks at the bank [illegible] and I observe that the official alluded to in my despatch was a Jew named and I have little doubt that he was personally interested in the success of his mission

5 Mr Wyatt's experience is by no means singular other British subjects who in some cases have shown [illegible] but in most have lowered [illegible] to British Chamber of Commerce who have been receiving [illegible] cases have requested me to protest to the Turkish Government but we decided that they do not wish individual protests to be made unless these do not avail as they receive special attention from the police [illegible] to date Spain have adopted this policy and have limited [illegible] to general protest but I feel that I shall certainly have to bring up the question again in personal conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs whenever I next go to Angora

6 There are other points for [illegible] I have had to protest during the last few weeks The Turkish authorities are steadily attempting to enforce more and more privileges for Turkish subjects Several British subjects have been informed by the police that after Monday other foreign porters must be dismissed and replaced by Turks A few days ago an announcement in a seemingly official form appeared in the press that in future only Turks would be allowed to act as chauffeurs In this case I was not sure what was the nature of this decision and I have since enquired of Nusret Bey as to what this means asking for a copy of the law or decree mentioned and enquiring whether British subjects are affected

7 There are other cases to which I might also refer Attempts have recently been made to force the British firms here to subscribe to the aviation fund and to exact payment of military transport tax from British subjects In the former case the firms suggested resisted successfully in the latter so far as I know at the time of writing no [illegible] payment has been made In both cases I have protested. Nusret Bey I am writing and have also spoken strongly to him

8 Another case which I have taken up with Nusret Bey on which I have protested very much is that of the Smyrna Aidin Railway A short time ago the manager of the railway received a letter from the Minister of Communications instructing him to [illegible] within a short period [illegible] to dismiss all foreign employees except fifteen which the Government has agreed sufficient for the requirements of the railway The manager in reply pointed out that the agreement with the Government contained no [illegible] to any fixed number He added that it was impossible to comply with the Government's wishes at short notice especially as the latter's extensive railway programme had [illegible] the supply of railwaymen and had

actually crown land ... rights ... subject ... serve ... those whom they had ... The Government ... Lands ... with this space ... with the preliminary steps ... about to take ... accept ... Evidence ... more ... must ... three ... to seize ... her way ... after a period ... to ... appearance

9 [illegible] ... to the ... English High School ... for Girls This ... refer ... to ... despatch ... Nos 61 ... the 10th February) ... protest ... the ... the ... Turkish ... the ... school was ... hand ... appointments ... Turkish ... the ... question ... election ... Turkish teachers ... Sultan ... received ... reply to ... protest ... on the 17th February ... is ... greatly ... despatch ... appearance ... the press ... which I have ... honour ... to ... subject ... paper ... with ... I ... that ... whether ... has ... notice ... was ... correct ... it ... will ... be ... dangerous ... to ... pass ... such ... arguments ... the Oriental Secretary ... to see ... Nevertheless ... one ... that ... it ... would ... be ... necessary ... importance ... press ... Nevertheless ... that ... he ... details ... matter ... official ... Mr ... has ... seen ... Nevertheless ... previous ... conversation ... with ... him ... and ... If ... the ... letter ... appears ... to ... school ... be ... considered ... but ... my ... have ... some ... extract, ... has ... impression ... His Majesty's Government ... to ... instructions ... the ... Chief ... Inspectors ... report ... seen ... to ... you ... [illegible] ... shortly ... upon ... teachers ... to ... girls' school ... British ... appointed ... to ... control ... staff ... Moslem ... employees ... a ... Maltese ... would ... be ... to ... [illegible] ... and ... it ... that ... he ... to ... with ... instructions ... mistress ... to ... The ... matter ... is ... serious ... to ... [illegible] ... to ... [illegible] ... and ... [illegible] ... to ... the ... Black ... to ... the ... authorities ... I ... [illegible] ... that ... this ... exists ... will ... [illegible] ... they ... to ... [illegible] ... papers ... say ... the ... new ... exist ... I ... hope ... to ... the ... Parliament ... At ... the ... same ... time ... annual ... [illegible] ... effect ... of ... this ... reserve ... suffer ... [illegible] ... regrets ... to ... secure ... admission ... [illegible] ... to ... Mr ... foreign ... to ... His ... Majesty's ... Government ... to ... [illegible] ... to ... [illegible] ... to ... [illegible]

(Mr Wyatt) explained that Stamboul enquiring about the subjection of their pages and as the fact that the two pages of our Stamboul agency are both Moslems,

So we should bring it down by 5 pages of pages As regards our bank guards and gustavs the duties are very responsible ones We have four such foreign streets at Constantinople which one is British and one at Stamboul, the others being Moslem

Inspector Here are already five persons who must be replaced

Wyatt I am not on the principle that these bank guards come under the category of servants

Inspector Yes I am right I think the point will be and I base them off your bank, as has been the case with another I am sure but you know

Wyatt Is it a Banque Ottomane to which you refer

Inspector Exactly

Wyatt It is a small consideration but it would be the consequence of a most misleading

Inspector No at all, the instructions taking are objected in so far as they constitute the recruitment as a right to the whole of the staff the people to whom I refer are not subjects we can only want the principle of keeping a strong subject to Ottoman spectrists as regards the terms of their return to their country of origin

Wyatt [illegible] I am not in a position to

Inspector [illegible] on this point but I am not aware that I have received instructions to this effect

Wyatt I am sure [illegible] Minister who is very good to us that [illegible] consistent with these employees are [illegible] should be [illegible]

Inspector [illegible]

Wyatt I must [illegible] 2.5 per cent

Inspector With pleasure

Wyatt [illegible]

Inspector It is a question of [illegible]

Wyatt I am not in a position to [illegible] I have not had the opportunity to [illegible]

Inspector With regard to the new [illegible] I wrote a letter to the Commissioner [illegible] in connection with the question

Wyatt I am [illegible] in connection

Inspector I [illegible] 2.5 per cent as regards pay [illegible] It is only to avoid extra work and correspondence that we have put it through the Government as a whole

Wyatt I only suggested 2.5 because it is to arrive at a percentage of 25 per cent in keeping with Moslems to Moslems and when questions arise [illegible] present itself I am now at a standstill myself

Inspector You have shown me [illegible]

Wyatt You must [illegible] what I say but I can assure you that My Government regard the matter Moslem staff should be 25 per cent the Christian staff should be 75 per cent

Inspector With other countries I have communicated with in connection with [illegible] that we are not prepared to commence taking steps to [illegible] that we will not be so in the future either

Wyatt So you cannot increase your present non-Moslem staff?

Inspector You cannot [illegible] I can assure you that My Government regard the matter Moslem staff should be 25 per cent the Christian staff should be 75 per cent

E 1718 373 44 No.

Secret Report of Events at Angora from 15th March to 5th April 1926

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that I had a long interview with Ghazi Mustafa Kemal at Angora on the 5th instant having proceeded there with the object of verifying the telegram No. 23 of the 5th March.

2. I told him I was glad that I had been ordered to Angora in order to clear up certain points since I had not seen him at the anti-foreign acts which the Constantinople authorities had become so active in since the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne. I was also glad to see him as the representative of His Majesty's Government. We were now having negotiations about Mosul which were going well and proceeding when the other end of Turkey in Europe and Thrace were being ruthlessly squeezed out and British traders and business men were being harassed, interned, molested, and had to leave the country. It was necessary to know where we stood and I wished to be able to report to you whether I was welcome in London.

3. We began on the suspected Bristol envoy case, those arrested and certain Greek subjects, but I was told that only those whose cases had been referred to the authorities to discuss their release by Ismet Pasha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had been taken. The existence of the Mosul question was then brought to His Majesty's Government's attention. I explained that as long as the Mosul question was unsettled it was impossible for the Turkish people to feel friendly towards us, and that as long as they were harassed and persecuted by the officials of the Angora Government, so long would they be unfriendly towards us. Now I was aware that in the case of the Bristol envoy and other cases of this kind reference had to be made to Angora, but I was sure that the Turkish Government would not wish to be considered as condoning the action of their officials in these cases. I pointed out that the Mosul question was one which could be settled by negotiation, and that the Turkish Government would not be wise to allow the Mosul question to be the cause of a rupture between Great Britain and Turkey. I also pointed out

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2. As regards your question whether the protest at Constantinople would be of any effect, I am afraid that the Italian Ambassador appears to be right, in that protests to be made, our three governments are in possession of all the available facts and can, if they wish, the matter in question before the proper place under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne.

3. It is good to have general sense, against intervention once more, but from the point of view of safeguarding the interests of the Iraq Petroleum Company it is very important that we should not be drawn into a war between Constantinople and Angora. Without the use of force I do not see how we can prevent Mustapha Kemal Pasha from occupying Mosul if he is determined to do so, and I am not prepared to contemplate the employment of force for that purpose.

4. You should inform the Grand Vizier that His Majesty's Government are prepared to support the claim of the Iraq Government to the Province of Mosul, but that they are not prepared to take any action which might lead to war with Turkey. They are, however, willing to refer the question to the League of Nations, provided that the Turkish Government undertake to abide by the decision of the Council of the League.

5. You should also inform the Grand Vizier that His Majesty's Government are prepared to recommend to the Council of the League that the Turkish Government should be granted a share of the oil royalties accruing to the Iraq Government from the Mosul oilfields, in accordance with the principle laid down in the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of June 5th, 1924, provided that the Turkish Government undertake to accept the decision of the Council of the League as to the exact proportion in which the royalties should be divided between the Iraq Government and the Turkish Government.

6. You should point out to the Grand Vizier that the Turkish Government have already had the opportunity of stating their case before the Council of the League, and that the Council, after hearing the case on both sides, decided that the Province of Mosul should be included in Iraq. His Majesty's Government cannot, therefore, support the Turkish claim to the Province of Mosul, but they are prepared to recommend to the Council of the League that the Turkish Government should be granted a share of the oil royalties accruing to the Iraq Government from the Mosul oilfields, in accordance with the principle laid down in the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of June 5th, 1924, provided that the Turkish Government undertake to accept the decision of the Council of the League as to the exact proportion in which the royalties should be divided between the Iraq Government and the Turkish Government.

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91. You should also inform the Grand Vizier that His Majesty

with that Embassy he generally concurs but the two cases are similar and I can offer no other suggestion

3. I am informed that Italian Government in spite of its problems of over population and unemployment is assisting necessitous to leave Smyrna for Rhodes. It would however, the home country, the Italian subjects suffer to starve in the streets. It appears to me that the money which may have eventually to be spent in relief would be better expended in preventing the necessity for such relief. I have the honour therefore to recommend that representations be made to the Italian authorities for the exercise by Government of Italy where necessary of control over the removal from Smyrna of distressed British subjects who have no connection with the United Kingdom or other countries which maintain consulates and the local laws do not prevent their free emigration without

I have, &c.
A. F. WATKINSON

No. 41

Sir Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received March 17)

No. 440
Telegraphic *Constantinople* March 16, 1926

My immediate preceding telegram.

Question would be settled if article 254 of Penal Code were corrected to section of last words of article being "those who have professed to-day Christian or Mussulman religion."

No. 42

Sir H. Farrell to the Secretary of State, to Mr. Hoare (Constantinople)

No. 27
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office March 17, 1926*

Your Telegrams Nos. 32 and 33 of 15th March: English High School.

You are entirely to take action proposed in second paragraph of your telegram No. 32 in event of no protest being received.

No. 43

Mr. Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received March 19)

(No. 80)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople March 18, 1926*

MY telegram No. 35.

Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs delivered message that evacuation of Caralossa is being proceeded with and that school is to be opened. Two ships leaving Italian delegates telegraphing to enquire whether this means new proposal or what

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E 1884 1021 44 No. 44

Memorandum from British Embassy, Constantinople — Received March 20

THE situation in Turkey is very depressing, and I am wondering how long the present state of things is going to last. To say the least of it I am disappointed, for I had hoped that the nationalist regime would have meant progress in the long run. I fear, however, that this is going for a long time to be a period of arbitrary and corrupt methods of the worst Asiatic sort.

The Angora press, as I recently felt in the early days of the present regime, when several letters have now given ground to the sharpness of a razor's edge. Raw Official notes of protest, official verbal representations and free invective have all been flung at the former, are politely ignored, the latter looked upon with suspicion.

There is no doubt in my mind that it is the fixed intention of the present regime to crush the foreigner, the Greek, Armenian and now the Jew as well, by legislative blows delivered by a cabinet consisting of certain ministers of Angora, such as the Minister of Commerce, the Minister of Finance and others, who, under the cloak of nationalism are furthering their own interests, as well as those of their acolytes, and not the country's interests.

The Minister of Finance, primarily to obtain revenue and, secondly, to demonstrate that he, as well as that ignorant peasant and extreme nationalist Ali Djenany Bey, Minister of Commerce, is a partisan of the policy of Turkey for the modern Turk, has, as you are already aware, succeeded in combating any opposition to the institution of monopolies and will I fear unfortunately create others, until the consequent result that the process of elimination will continue, trade being placed as far as possible under Government control, a portion meted out to the Moslem Turk and little or nothing to the Christian, Turk and foreigner. This policy whilst being disastrous to the local foreigner and Christian Turk is in real value equally so to their own Moslem nationals and to the country, as well as to our own trade.

The Government is in a bad way financially. I hear from more than one source that the estimates of revenue for the year 1926 have not been realised. There are continual calls from the vilayets for funds to defray the cost of administration, the shortage of revenue in each administrative centre being accentuated by the loss incurred as the result of the abolition of the tithe. The new levy on produce transported from one locality to another is falling heavier particularly to contribute towards the loss incurred by Mr. Ashburgess's new project.

Revenue cannot be derived from monopolies such as those of gasoline, petroleum, tobacco, etc., materials still awaiting from the exchequer for the purchase of these commodities, the sale of which is to supply the revenue. New increases have been effected in the customs tariff, amounting to the wage costs of sugar and petroleum, while the Government is still being allowed to load arrears on the ryots' backs.

Bribery and corruption is rife. Much money is being made by all classes of officials in the campaign to force the employment of Turks in all institutions and private offices, and I have heard it said that a post has been found by a Turkish official, be this official a director of a commercial zone, a mayor, a prefect of police or an enormously remunerated sole agent, seeking to make a monthly contribution to the official concerned from his salary.

This is a sign of the times and goes to confirm my views at the time of the present regime's coming out from self-imposed retirement, the country's finances, hopelessly involved, provide for the non-payment of salaries paid to their heads.

The Government's shortsighted policy of acute accumulation will serve to affect the economic conditions of the country to a further aggravated extent to conditions as well for with the character of the foreign and non-Moslem will remain the peasant, for whom the Government is making large sacrifices, will suffer. There is practically no Turkish mercantile class as the Turkish trader of the Smyrna quay is the non-mercantile of commerce, and will find establishment in relation with foreign markets.

The peasant and the Turkish buyer in Anatolia will find that by the elimination of the only competent middleman, viz., the Foreigner or the Greek, Armenian or Jew, they are unable to dispose of their produce abroad, and will, therefore, find themselves with their stocks left on their hands. The year will consequently bring no purchases from the peasant, and the peasant, having no buyer, will be content to cultivate patches for his own and his family's consumption only. The country's purchasing power will greatly decrease as well, therefore exports to Turkey and consequently indirect Government contributions will drop as the result, and in addition direct contributions, a fair proportion of which is contributed by Turkey's white slaves, the foreign interpreters, will also diminish.

This is a sad reading, and I may be wrong in my forecast of the situation, but in any case the fact that large stocks of cotton goods in the interior and at the customs cannot be disposed of owing to the lack of purchase power is a sign of the times, and I only hope that it is not a forerunner of worse times to come.

HAROLD WOODS,
Commercial Secretary.

Constantinople, March 2, 1926.

(E 1899 59 44, No. 40

In the House of Commons Record March 17

(No. 120)

Supplementary

Westminster Chronicle March 17, 1920

In the House of Commons yesterday, the Assembly approved a bill to create a commission to oversee the development of the Thames Valley, including the construction of new reservoirs and flood defences. The bill passed its third reading by a majority of 214 votes, with 87 members abstaining. Opposition MPs criticized the project's estimated cost of £12 million, arguing that the funds could be better spent on improving existing infrastructure. Supporters, however, emphasized the need to prevent future flooding in low-lying areas.

The debate was marked by heated exchanges between Members from constituencies along the river and those representing inland areas. Mr. Edward Thornton, MP for Kingsbridge, argued that the commission would create jobs and boost local economies, while Lady Margaret Ashworth, MP for Riverton, countered that the money would be better used to repair roads and bridges damaged in last winter's storms. The Minister for Public Works, Sir Henry Caldwell, responded that the commission's powers would be limited to advisory functions, and that no construction could begin without further approval from Parliament.

The bill now moves to the House of Lords, where it is expected to face similar opposition. Lord Ashcroft has already tabled a motion to delay the second reading until a full environmental impact assessment is completed. The government has indicated that it will not accept any amendments that would significantly alter the bill's scope or timeline.

(E 1899 59 44, No. 41

In the House of Commons Record March 17

(No. 121)

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Westminster Chronicle March 17, 1920

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(E 1900 373 44 No. 42

In the House of Commons Record March 22

(No. 123)

Supplementary

Crossroads Chronicle March 1920

[illegible] perhaps [illegible] short [illegible] with [illegible] the [illegible] with [illegible] Boy, Director of the Department [illegible] Education [illegible] Mr. Ross, [illegible] Ross [illegible] the [illegible] 25th [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

ty over a range of settlement. As a matter of fact while the interview was actually taking place the telephone which could only have started under his orders was actually engaged in sending up the school rooms.

7. As you are aware from Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 101 of the 10th instant Lewis Rashop dressed on the 7th March when the Ambassador endeavoured to discuss the matter but he knew nothing about the affair beyond a telegraphic report from Nuret Bey and he was awaiting the detailed report on which he had to act. He was invited by Sir R. Lindsay to see the Minister of Public Instruction himself. On the 11th Nuret Bey came down to the station here to catch Sir R. Lindsay with the message suggesting that the school should get to accept Pasha Bey's proposal. Upon the latter's repeated call Rashi Bey would be replaced by a Moslem nominee. I have written to the Chief Inspector telling him that Sir R. Lindsay's first impression was that the Turks should in the words accept a definite treatment and work on lines which we can perhaps agree to adopt. The details will be discussed.

8. On the strength of the telegram from Nuret Bey to the effect that the Turkish Government had decided to close the school the Ambassador addressed a Note to the Turkish Government representing that the action of the Turkish authorities in the matter of the Anglo-Persian School was a breach of the Treaty of Lausanne and requesting that the Turkish Government should withdraw their decision. Nuret Bey's reply was to the effect that the Turkish Government had decided to close the school on the ground that the Turkish Government had decided to close the school on the ground that the Turkish Government had decided to close the school on the ground

that ... [illegible] ... received from London regarded it feel justified ... [illegible] ... [illegible]

I have &c.
R. H. HOARE

No. 48

... [illegible] ... Mr. Hoare to Sir ... [illegible] ... Received March 23

(No. ...)
(Telegraphic) ... [illegible] ... *Constantinople, March 22, 1926*

My telegram No. 36.

... [illegible] ... Mr. ... [illegible] ... [illegible] ... [illegible]

E 2054 59 44] No 53

Mr Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain —(Received March 29)

(No 37)

Sir *Constantinople, March 24, 1926.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that whereas in past years the 18th March has been allowed to pass without remark the yearly anniversary of the first landing of the Italians has been made the occasion of much boasting about the resistance offered by the Turkish army. Linked up with this have been references to the fighting at Sarikamish and Anafarta which it is recalled, Mustafa Kemal Pasha alone turned into Turkish victories. I can see against this no reason to withhold Ghazi's credit. It has been noticeable also that the press is being used in a new way for the glorification of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Its references to him are no longer in the high-flown language nearly as servile as that in which Abdul Hamid was spoken of when on the throne, but utterly articles have appeared whose only point is to eulogise the President. It is also noticed that always have personal knowledge of more contemptible reminiscences to writing may be observed by the Ministry of Public Instruction.

The chief of these seems, other than "Jack-in-the-box" recalls the time when the great man of to-day was but a junior major who was used to meet at the cafe at Salonica. He also recalls some more recent memories of the days when the dictator, then known that his own intelligence officers were most concerned at the movements of certain Greek officers. Y Nuzy, of the Journal d'Orient also recollects some of the Ghazi searches and for something in return for the Smyrna concession. Not even the sun can be dimmed with.

2. Another paper the Milliyet to-day starts on a series of recollections. They would be the most interesting stuff. The Ghazi ever published, were it not for the fact that they were to the enemies. After referring to certain services rendered to the Ghazi by Mr Ward Price, the Daily Mail correspondent, the writer says that when he was in Angora in the autumn of 1921 the Ghazi was running the Turkish government and the country was going to the dogs. They were not getting on with the Russians. Major Yuksel Jenkins, whose office was that he was Chief of Staff, Kemal Minister of War, Commander-in-Chief, Chief General Staff, and Secretary of State, all rolled into one. Kemal was at his wits' end. He was in despair. He was losing popularity rapidly. Ismet was at Lausanne. Ismet was in Paris. Ismet was in London. Ismet was in Rome. Ismet was in Berlin. Ismet was in Vienna. Ismet was in Prague. Ismet was in Budapest. Ismet was in Belgrade. Ismet was in Sofia. Ismet was in Athens. Ismet was in Constantinople. Ismet was in Smyrna. Ismet was in Adana. Ismet was in Aleppo. Ismet was in Damascus. Ismet was in Jerusalem. Ismet was in Cairo. Ismet was in Alexandria. Ismet was in Port Said. Ismet was in Suez. Ismet was in Aden. Ismet was in Bombay. Ismet was in Calcutta. Ismet was in Madras. Ismet was in Colombo. Ismet was in Singapore. Ismet was in Hong Kong. Ismet was in Shanghai. Ismet was in Tokyo. Ismet was in Yokohama. Ismet was in Kobe. Ismet was in Nagasaki. Ismet was in Vladivostok. Ismet was in Harbin. Ismet was in Mukden. Ismet was in Peking. Ismet was in Tientsin. Ismet was in Nanking. Ismet was in Hankow. Ismet was in Canton. Ismet was in Macao. Ismet was in Hong Kong. Ismet was in Manila. Ismet was in Singapore. Ismet was in Penang. Ismet was in Rangoon. Ismet was in Calcutta. Ismet was in Bombay. Ismet was in Karachi. Ismet was in Basra. Ismet was in Baghdad. Ismet was in Mosul. Ismet was in Aleppo. Ismet was in Damascus. Ismet was in Beirut. Ismet was in Jerusalem. Ismet was in Amman. Ismet was in Cairo. Ismet was in Alexandria. Ismet was in Port Said. Ismet was in Suez. Ismet was in Aden. Ismet was in Bombay. Ismet was in Calcutta. Ismet was in Madras. Ismet was in Colombo

was Minister who had been subsequently prosecuted presumably by the Minister of Education for the following promise

7. At the beginning of the interview Nuri Bey despatched a telegram to Angora requesting his Minister who is acting Minister of Justice for the moment to quash the legal proceedings.

8. At the end of the interview we agreed that we would inform me in the course of the morning whether the Public Prosecutor had received the requisite instructions. If he had not I would send him for telegraphic transmission to Angora a note on the lines of what I had spoken as reported in paragraph 5 above. A copy of my note is enclosed herewith.

9. I received information during the morning, I am assuming a considerable resistance to quash, and that Nuri Bey could use the attitude of resistance which I proposed to take up as reported in my telegram No. 39 of Friday and this appears to be borne out by your telegram No. 27 of the 17th March we shall have to face and defeat an outburst of nationalist fury. I do not therefore construe me to give way and to allow Miss Fleming to stay and her trial by note will *ipso facto* be completely quashed this forenoon Nationalist Government will draw the correct inference that they can ride roughshod over rights under the Treaty of Lausanne and not attempt to press how far recourse is to be had to the settlement procedure under the treaty and how far we should be prepared to go in measures

We have

24

10. Since the above have received assurances that the prosecution of Miss Fleming has actually and finally been dropped. I am therefore not sending the note which forms the enclosure to this despatch. I drafted it in its present form with a view to its being telegraphed to Angora. I propose subject to your approval to extend a minimum amount that the Ministry of Public Instruction should be allowed to play fast and loose with Turkey's international obligations. The Ministry of Public Instruction as indeed most of the departments of the present Government have got the idea into their heads that any attempt to assert any rights is a threat to invoke all the privileges of the Capitulations. The struggle I foresee until we compel the Minister for Foreign Affairs to take up this matter on behalf of the contentious minority of the points raised regarding the schools. See R. I. Cassels's note of the 9th February. In the opinion of the writer the matter is ripe for the latter which in the event of the unpleasant result I must have called him over the coals. I think in the event of Tewfik Rushdi Bey's not being willing to quash I should therefore be obliged if I could be given authority preferably by telegraph to submit to the Turkish Government the following proposal. I would have submitted draft letter but I have not got the [illegible]

I have &c.
R. H. HOARE

Enclosure in No.

Note to Nusret Bey

Ambassade d'Angleterre, Constantinople
le 23 mars 1926

Monsieur le Ministre

DANS l'espoir que l'entretien accordé ce matin ne prévoit pas tous les résultats que je suis autorisé à espérer, j'ai l'honneur de télégraphier d'urgence à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires étrangères un message personnel dans le sens suivant.

J'ai reçu de mon gouvernement une lettre me déléguant l'assurance que les pourparlers actuellement entre ses services et ceux du Ministère de l'Instruction publique au sujet de la Direction de l'Ecole anglaise étaient abandonnés. Jusqu'à ce que l'affaire soit tranchée par le Procureur général, aucune instruction à cet effet ne restera en vigueur.

Je viens d'apprendre que les poursuites contre la Directrice de cette école ont été abandonnées.

Je me hâte de faire part de ces renseignements au Directeur de l'Instruction publique et je saisis cette occasion pour renouveler à Son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires étrangères l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

Le gouvernement a répondu le 7 février et soutenant que ses décisions étaient conformes aux traités et engageant à diriger, l'admettre à l'enseignement

Le comité [illegible] a mis à [illegible] a protesté auprès de l'Ambassadeur qui estimait que ses interventions étaient nécessaires et justifiées sur la base de la lettre de son Excellence Ismet Pacha en date du 24 juillet 1923 annexée au Traité de Lausanne, transmise à la délégation soviétique à Genève. Le service de l'école a été [illegible] et le Ministre de l'Instruction publique a soumis la question de cette école à Nouri Bey, qui a suspendu [illegible] et [illegible] la représentation diplomatique.

La réponse du Département de l'Instruction publique a été négative et [illegible] Nouri Bey a reçu les protestations [illegible] pour la seconde fois. Cette communication est en date du 3 mars.

Depuis ce jour les négociations se poursuivent afin de permettre la réouverture de l'école. Aucune des deux assemblées n'a encore abordé la question de cette école. Il semble que [illegible] toute l'affaire les [illegible] du Département de l'Instruction publique et du Ministère des Affaires étrangères.

Le [illegible] a pris [illegible] de [illegible] la [illegible] de [illegible] en [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

anglaise est celle qui a été proposée par lui et développée par moi à Son Excellence M. l'Ambassadeur et à vous même. Cette solution ne pourrait être formulée comme suit :

La directrice, Mlle Chevalley, accepterait comme professeur d'histoire Youssouf Rassih Bey, nommé à cet effet par le Ministre de l'Instruction publique et qui, après un court laps de temps, serait chargé d'une autre [illegible]

J'ai, &c.,
M. NOUSRET.

Enclosure in No. 36.

Mr. Hoare to Nouret Bey.

(After Nouret Bey) *Constantinople, 22 mars* 1926.

VEUILLEZ informer Son Excellence Tewfik Rouchdi Bey de votre réponse au message contenu dans votre lettre d'hier que la nomination de la High School est prête à accepter Youssouf Bey comme professeur et remettra une lettre à cet effet au représentant [illegible] qui sera chargé de faire observer les sceaux fixés [illegible].

Les [illegible] de Pages et Chevalley ont été informés de la décision de [illegible] et ont été [illegible] de leur [illegible]. Je vous adresse également [illegible] de cette précédente [illegible] pour le moment [illegible] Youssouf Rassih Bey, car je ne vois d'autre [illegible] les partages non testés [illegible] ne se produise pas autour de sa personne et je compte également sur votre coopération pour [illegible] Son Excellence Tewfik Rouchdi Bey pour atténuer [illegible] pour l'expectative [illegible].

Veuillez, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

No. 37.

Mr. Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (*Received April* 1, 1926.)

(No. 46.)

[illegible]

Constantinople, March 30, 1926.

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 140 of the 24th instant, I have the honour to report that the Vali has requested Rassih Bey to state that there was never any question of instituting a prosecution, and that it is now learnt from Public Prosecutor that the case is [illegible] that will be dropped.

It is said that within a few days of the time fixed for the prosecution a telegram was received from Angora stating that there was to be no prosecution, and that if the case was not dropped it could only be because some other department was involved. I can only say that I do not understand this message, and about an hour later I received a further message stating that the Vali (who is the administrative channel in these matters) had received instructions to cancel the prosecution and was engaged in drafting the requisite communication to the public prosecutor. I accordingly addressed a note to the delegate of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, taking formal act of this message, a copy of which is enclosed herewith.

4. I will now summarise and supplement my telegraphic reports of what has occurred since the 24th March.

On the following day, the 25th March, the case was none the less called. Although the public prosecutor was represented in the court, no attempt was made to assist the judge to settle the case out of hand. He accordingly adjourned it, observing that the last paper in the dossier before him was a letter from the directress of the school to the Department of Education in which she stated that she could not accept Rassih Bey pending the result of discussions which had been initiated between the Embassy and the Turkish Government. He therefore proposed to obtain further information from the public prosecutor as to the subsequent developments of the matter, and to adjourn the case till the 30th March.

I was unable to see Nouret Bey the next day, as it was a Friday, and when I saw him on Saturday I opened the conversation, throughout the course of which he displayed great embarrassment by asking for an explanation of the proceedings in court. I had been assured that the case would be dropped, not only had it not been

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E 2189/2189/44 No. 38.

Mr. Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (*Received April* 6, 1926.)

(No. 174. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 31, 1926.*

SAKARYA YOLU ZAMANI reports the following appreciation of the Russian mentality:—

> Mr. Cerruti, a delegate who has had a long experience in Russia and has gained from it insight into Russian mentality, is wont to tell me that Russian acts, for apparently quite incomprehensible causes, can only be traced back to [illegible] that someone before something [illegible] that [illegible] had given [illegible] as an example of this their [illegible] and childish obsession that the weakest British point in the Middle East is to attack on Russia preferably through the Caucasus or Persia.

Confidential Print. March 2, 1926.

Such knowledge as I have on this question inclines me to believe that it is true, and, though I feel considerably less confidence in expressing any opinion regarding the mentality of the Angora Government, it is probably true that the attitude of the Turkish journalists reflects fairly closely what is thought and said at Angora, especially when the leading representatives of the Government are gathered round the Ghazi late at night. We constantly read in the press that the League of Nations is the [illegible] of Great Britain, and that the Pact of Locarno is nothing more than the official endorsement of Great Britain's supremacy over France and Germany; hence our bitter disappointment that the result will have been a check at Geneva. But for that check Great Britain's hands would have been free to pursue her dreams of establishing her supremacy throughout the continent of Asia, Turkey being the first objective. Fantastic though it may seem, I believe this fear to have a considerable hold on the Turkish mind, and therefore the Turks have an instinctive impulse to hit out at anyone before or during strikes them.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

[E 2191/373/44] No. 39.

Mr. Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (*Received April* 6, 1926.)

(No. 188.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 31, 1926.*

IN confirmation of my despatches Nos. 141 and 142 of the 24th March and with reference to my recent telegrams, I have the honour to report that my negotiations with the Turkish Government arising out of the sealing of the British High School for Girls and the attempt to prosecute the directress of that school have followed the tortuous and unsatisfactory course which is apparently inevitable in this country.

2. For the moment at present is that the seals have been removed, that the directress has been acquitted by a verdict which is highly contemptuous and that no steps have as yet been taken to proceed against Youssouf Rassih Bey, whose appointment to the school was the immediate cause of all the trouble. Furthermore, I have not received the slightest hint that, as was to Sir A. Lindsay's note of the 9th February regarding the difficulty of conducting the school as the result of a series of vexatious administrative measures may be expected in any near future.

3. I stated towards the end of my despatch No. 141 of the 23rd March that I had now received an assurance that the prosecution was finally dropped. In view of subsequent developments it is perhaps well that I should report exactly what occurred. The delegate telephoned at 11.30 A.M. to say that he had just received a telegram from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stating that the Ministry of Education had cancelled the prosecution, and that if the prosecution had not been dropped it could only be because some other department was involved. I said, very truly, that I did not understand this message, and about an hour later I received a further message stating that the Vali (who is the administrative channel in these matters) had received instructions to cancel the prosecution and was engaged in drafting the requisite communication to the public prosecutor. I accordingly addressed a note to the delegate of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, taking formal act of this message, a copy of which is enclosed herewith.

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dropped out to a sheer reprieved. Nusret Bey said that case of trial at once could not, under Treaty, be given, as instructions had been issued. I could be assured that the matter would be settled to our complete satisfaction. I pointed out that nothing of the kind occurred to date gave us the impression of getting a satisfactory result. I do not propose to enter into a statement regarding the terms of Turkish law. I do not accept it as a fact but only as the assurance we had been given in order to see if they meant what they said. Whatever the correct interpretation of the case should be used. What will this portend, my dear?

Nusret Bey would not express himself that case would be referred to Supreme Court when it would be for the opposite result based. I said that this was evident as long as the Turkish Government refused to see March 6 attack the case was. I therefore had to leave days in which to solve their difficulties. I said I was responsible to my Government that I thought it would be wise to take a grave view by the steps we may take. What those steps would be I did not express.

Nusret Bey suggested I should not take any steps at all, and to create excitement. Nothing would be gained by the action would be regretted when it was all over. I said I was sorry to differ from him, but I was instructed to take steps to protect the interests of the Mission and I could not do so. I then asked whether he had got Minister's reply. He said that he had not, but he would telephone to Ministry for it. I said that I would wait. He then left the room to telephone. On his return he said that this would be all right and that Nusret Bey would be in Constantinople on Wednesday. I said that this would be satisfactory. Nusret Bey then said that he would like to see me and Consul-General together. I said that I would be glad to see him at the Consulate-General at 4 p.m. on Tuesday.

I then left. I was sorry that I had to take this step against the wishes of Nusret Bey, but I was instructed by Minister to do so. I am sure that Nusret Bey will be disappointed with the result of the interview. I am sure that he will be disappointed with the result of the interview. I am sure that he will be disappointed with the result of the interview.

[illegible] Ambassade de Grande Bretagne à la Porte de Vienne sous cette question fournit l'objet d'une correspondance diplomatique

Il est toujours possible qu'il surgisse encore [illegible] entre les deux Cours relativement à la question [illegible] mais nous ne croyons pas qu'elles puissent être de nature à amener une rupture

J'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que j'ai fait part de ce qui précède au Gouvernement, auquel j'ai référé

No. 59

Mr. Heath to Mr. Bee

Embassy, Angora, December 12, 1852

Mr. Bee

I have received your Excellency's despatch of the 7th instant, in which you have informed me that Mr. Bevan has been appointed to the Consulate at Salonica, and that Mr. Hogg is to proceed to Erzeroum as Vice-Consul.

Your Excellency's wishes in regard to the Consular Establishments in Turkey will be duly attended to.

I have also received your despatch of the 8th instant, enclosing a copy of a letter from Mr. Consul Brant, and I shall not fail to bring the subject of the Consular Establishments at Trebizond and Erzeroum under the notice of the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.
R. H. HEATH.

No. 60

Sir [illegible] to Mr. Bee

No. 1 Embassy
Despatch

Foreign Office, July 7, 1853

Sir,

I have received your despatch [illegible] relative to the appointment of Mr. Bevan to the Consulate at Salonica, and of Mr. Hogg to the Vice-Consulate at Erzeroum.

You have done right in [illegible] and I approve your having [illegible] to the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) [illegible]

No. 61

Sir [illegible] to Mr. Bee

No. 47
Despatch

Foreign Office, July 7, 1853

Sir,

I have received your despatch No. 52 of the 2nd ultimo, [illegible] Mr. Consul Brant [illegible] Trebizond and Erzeroum.

You will [illegible] Mr. Brant's wishes [illegible] Turkish Government [illegible] Consulate at Trebizond [illegible] Her Majesty's Government [illegible] Turks

I am, &c.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

As regards the suggestion that we should take over from the Turks the task of possession, power to Feisal is not necessary to secure we shall be glad to see it so and I suggest that Hodgson should be instructed to raise this matter also with Sir Percy Cox.

No. 2

Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 7, 1926)

(No. 68)

Sir, *Pera, April 1, 1926.*

With reference to my despatch No. 58 of the 31st March, the English girls' school at Constantinople.

I have the honour to enclose herewith a proposed text for the Convention of Lausanne, which Mr. Monroe has been charged to put to the Turkish Government with regard to the Christian minority without affording any other protection.

No. 3

Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople) to the Marquess of Crewe (Received April 12)

(No. 52)

Constantinople, *April 8, 1926.*

WHITE PAPER ON DEPORTATIONS: BRITISH WOMEN'S COLLEGE: STAT WEEK.

With reference to your despatch of March 31st, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a Note which I addressed to the Angora Government on the 6th April, and of their reply.

2. I am glad to see that the Angora Government have decided to withdraw the White Paper, and I trust that the Turkish Government will not be induced to republish it.

3. The British Women's College at Constantinople, which was founded in 1924 by Miss Stat Week, has been recognised by the Ministry of Public Instruction as a Turkish school, and has been granted the right to confer degrees.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

E 2329/59/44 No. 4

Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 12)

(No. 70)

Constantinople, *April 7, 1926.*

HIS MAJESTY'S REPRESENTATIVE AT CONSTANTINOPLE PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND HAS THE HONOUR TO TRANSMIT HEREWITH COPY OF DESPATCH No. 2 FROM THE BRITISH CONSULATE AT ADANA, DATED THE 4TH APRIL 1926, RESPECTING EVENTS AT ADANA.

Enclosure No. 1 in No. 4

Major Hornby (Adana) to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)

(No. 2)

Sir, *Consulate, Adana, April 4, 1926.*

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REPORT FOR YOUR INFORMATION THAT MY VISIT TO ADANA ON 30TH MARCH AND 1ST APRIL, WHICH WAS MADE IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISTRESS CAUSED BY THE RECENT EARTHQUAKE, WAS MARKED BY VARIOUS INCIDENTS OF A POLITICAL CHARACTER, OF WHICH I HAVE THE HONOUR TO INFORM YOU AS FOLLOWS:—

2. APART FROM THE RELIEF WORK CARRIED ON BY VILAYETS WHICH IS DESCRIBED IN MY REPORT TO THE EMBASSY, A LARGE NUMBER OF TROOPS HAVE BEEN

KEPT UNDER THE VILAYET AND VILAYA DISTRICTS ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT. FEW WEEKLY PASSENGERS BROUGHT INTO VILAYA, WHO ARE COME FROM THE ISLAHIE AREA. ABOUT SOME 250 MORE ARE EXPECTED, AND THERE HAS BEEN SOME KIND OF RISING AT MUSTAFA BEG AREA WHERE SOME TURBAT ARRESTS HAVE BEEN MADE. THOSE ARRESTED AT VILAYA HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED AS BRIGANDS, BUT I UNDERSTAND THAT THEY WERE DEMONSTRATING AGAINST RETURNS OF LAST LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS, AND THOSE BROUGHT INTO ADANA WERE DISTRICT DEPUTIES.

THE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE EVACUATION OF ADANA ARE CONNECTED WITH THAT SPECIAL SPIRIT OF DISSATISFACTION THAT THE GOVERNMENT EXPECTS. INDEED THE ARMENIAN PRIEST AND DISCONTENTED ELEMENTS CONSTITUTE A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF THOSE ASSISTING. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SAY WHAT BEST BE DESCRIBED AS A COMPLETE FROST. THESE WORDS TO SOME EXTENT PERHAPS ACCOUNT FOR THE DISTURBANCES OF THE VALI WHICH OCCURRED A FEW DAYS AGO. MEMORANDUM No. 47 INTERNAL UNREST.

3. TURKEY AT LEAST THE PEOPLE OF THE ADANA ADALIA LITTORAL ARE DISTINCTLY DIFFERENT. THEY MAY BE LIKENED TO A SNAKE WHO WAS CONTEMPLATING PREYING. HE WAS CONSIDERING THE STEPS HE SHOULD TAKE THAT THE ABBEY SWATHING. THE MILK IN THIS CASE IS THE MOSUL TO BE HANDED MESSRS.

ADALIA FEELS THAT SOMETHING IS GOING TO BE MADE TO SEPARATE MOSUL FROM TURKEY. THIS OPPOSITION WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY CONSEQUENCES THAT ADANA WOULD BE FLOODED WITH REFUGEES. THE VALI AND THE LITTORAL.

IT IS HOPED THAT SUCH A TASK IS NOT TOO DIFFICULT. THE MOST IMPORTANT WHICH CANNOT BE GIVEN WAS THE INSPECTION OF THE POINTS WHICH ARE TO BE EVACUATED BEFORE GIVING POSSIBLE DARKENING OF ENEMIES AND DESTRUCTION OF THE MOSUL. MEMORANDUM No. 48 PROPOSED REPORTS.

4. ACCORDING TO THE FRENCH AGREEMENT OF THE 30TH OCTOBER, 1921, THE CROSSINGS OF THE TAURUS MOUNTAINS ARE APPROACHED AT THE PASS OF BELEN, WHICH IS SOMEWHAT DIFFICULT. SOME KADIRLI AND OSMANIYE. MEMORANDUM No. 49 REPORTS ON THE ROADS. ACCORDING TO THE AGREEMENT OF ANGORA AGREEMENT OF ANKARA, THE ROAD IS NOT TO BE USED. THIS AND THE LOWER PASS OF BELEN ARE IMPORTANT ROADS. ALL THE EMPLOYEES ARE BROUGHT TO ADANA BY THE STATE. MEMORANDUM No. 50 TRADE AND RELATIONS.

5. IN ADANA STREETS ARE PRETTY WELL SPARED. ALTHOUGH THE TOWN ITSELF IS ON A SMALL AREA IT IS QUITE PARTLY WOODED. PRETTY SHADED BY TREES. THE STREET LEADS THE SEA AND FOR THE MOST PART OVER. THE EXPORT HAS LARGE STOCKS WHICH CAN BE PRODUCTS OF CEREALS, AUSTRIA AND LEATHER PRODUCTS. BUT ALTHOUGH A GOOD MANY SHOPS ARE OPEN, MOST OF THEM ARE CLOSED. THE TOWN IS NOT DESTROYED TO INCREASE THE WEALTH OF THE PEOPLE. THE STATE OF EUROPE. THE SOIL IS FAVOURABLE AND THE CLIMATE VERY SUITABLE. 1926 SEASON WOULD BE VERY GOOD.

MESSRS. SCHLUMBERGER, LIMITED, HAVE ENDEAVOURED TO GET THE FACTORY ASSISTED. THEY HAVE TO BE SENT TO THE FOLLOWING STEPS. LOST IN M.A.R. ROAD TO THE MESSAGE. PAPER, AND OTHER MATERIALS FREQUENTLY ARE CONSUMED. THE WAREHOUSES AS WELL AS THE SHOPS ARE CLOSED. THE HOUSES ARE BEING BUILT IN ACCORDANCE AND THERE IS A GENERAL FEELING OF SECURITY ABOUT THE PLACE. THE PROBABILITY TO THE LARGER PROPORTION OF EUROPEANS. THE SEASON IS LIKELY TO BE OF HIGHER WORKS BEING COMMENCED AT MERSIN AT SOME FUTURE TIME.

6. THERE IS A GOOD RAILWAY SERVICE BETWEEN MERSIN AND ADANA. FIVE TRAINS EACH WAY, WHICH TAKE ABOUT TWO HOURS AND A HALF. THE ROAD IS IN EXCELLENT CONDITION AND WAS TO PAYAS AND ALEPPO.

THE ROADS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE MERSIN ADANA ROAD, ARE NOW UNDER REPAIR AND ARE READY FOR USE. THE AFTERMATH ARE UNNECESSARY FOR A TRACTOR PORT MONEY IN NOTE. (EAST BOOK OF ASIA MINOR).

7. IN THE COURSE OF MY VISIT TO ADANA ON MONDAY, 30TH MARCH, THERE WERE SIGNS OF UNREST AMONG THE TROOPS AND SOLDIERS WHO WERE IN THE TOWN AT THE BARRACKS OUTSIDE THE TOWN. THE STRENGTH OF THE GARRISON HERE CONSISTS OF ABOUT 500 OFFICERS AND MEN. IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 13TH DIVISION AT MERSIN AND THE 23RD INFANTRY REGIMENT IS QUARTERED THERE ARE NOT MORE THAN 1,000 MEN AND NO MATERIAL.

WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A PARTY OF SOME THIRTY MEN (SOME OF WHOM WERE EVIDENTLY SUFFERING FROM FEVER AND ALL LOOKED HALF STARVED) WHO WERE MISERABLY CLAD

returning from their homes for Dardanelles I saw no [illegible] movements (Memorandum No 30 Movements of Troops and Material

7 Although the authorities made no objections about my visit to the various places mentioned in my request I have no doubt that they were pretty well informed as to my movements On the first two occasions when I arrived at the hotel where I was most communicative volunteering information of his own accord was the manager of the Yeni Turk a Hotel where I stayed The second occasion after I had left Captain of the General Staff started to question me at the table where I was sitting in the dining room and from general conversation soon took occasion to ask me what I had seen and what I was going to see At first I was sceptical that the whole thing had been staged for the benefit of the distinguished visitor but after I had visited a number of the districts on the Asiatic side and had had practically no other glimpse of the life and material interests of the country than Fort Rouge Erzerum the hospitals and one or two barracks I doubted that I should have learned much more had I been allowed to travel by myself as freely as they have been

I have &c
R E HARVEY Lt -Col

No 5

Letter from Sir E Crowe to Sir E Phipps (Received April 18)

(No 64)
Telegraph *Foreign Office* April 17 1926

I REGRET that I cannot undertake to discuss over existing differences between the governments of Russia and Turkey the departure from Turkey of all members of the Russian Embassy and Consulates

Records of Angora Embassy No 2

E 2472 59 44 No 6

Sir H Rumbold (Angora) to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received April 19)

No 18
Sir *Constantinople* April 12 1926

I HAVE the honour to report briefly on the general political situation as it strikes me after a fortnight's absence and on the eve of my departure for Angora to negotiate with the Irak frontier

The situation in general and of the present regime as a whole is still satisfactory and the outlook on politics somewhat more reserved now that Ismet Pasha was absent from the scene The chief asset which the Kemalist party has in the west too is to them somewhat faded the more material and social advances afforded to the peasant by heavy taxes and the attention given to the two great centres of Smyrna and Constantinople The disarmament of these latter has been made use of to give the whole country a sense of security wherever the entry to force has not been marked by any acute crisis of supply which has forced the communities up to fantastic prices to the consumer The general restlessness is however, to some extent counterbalanced by the distinctly acute problem to which the Government's labour, which is a most unpopular

The Chief considers that Fuad Russia Italy is in a more risky position than ever and that there is very little time to negotiate about the frontier by the 1st October when the President, who really is part a settlement I need hardly say that in this opinion I concur Whether or not success or failure, Ismet's case will be a matter of the most complete indifference to me More interesting, however, is a report from a reliable source that the Ghazi is trying to bring about a rapprochement with Russia and further that Soviet Government is most extremist friends

4 The press has a great deal to say about the date of my departure but remains silent on the political side of the frontier question It is evidently being kept out, and the few leading articles as appear say very little Ahmed Aga Oghlu who is also certainly in the pay of the Russians, in the Hakimiet Milie three or four days ago tried to discredit Sir Austen by saying that Turkey would not get Mosul now

5 There is marked nervousness that Italy intends to overlay its alleged aggressive tendencies You will see from Major Havelock's report enclosed in my despatch No 17 of the 7th April that Ismet Pasha's recent tour along the south coast was really a military inspection of possible landing places, and one also does hear of the apprehensions aroused by Signor Mussolini's vibrant speeches The Italian Ambassador assures me that he is merely the rearings of a cocking dove but he displayed great anxiety to know whether, as reported in a local paper we intended to guarantee Turkey's frontiers by way

6 On the whole Turkey's weak and sober Government is now conscious of her weakness There is unquestionably a strong desire to come to terms with His Majesty's Government over the frontier and a settlement can be made easily Whether it can be had on the terms I am authorised to offer will transpire shortly

7 I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Acting High Commissioner for Irak

I have &c
R C LINDSAY

No 67

Mr Lindsay (Angora) to Sir Austen Chamberlain Received to Foreign Office Received April 19

(No 9)
Telegraphic *Angora April 19 1926*

MR HOARE Sofia and No 2

MUSSOLINI'S address of 16th April have greatly increased tension existing between Turkey and Italy Turkish press has been violently anti-Italian and Turkish Government have taken certain measures

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No 68

Sir R Graham (Rome) to Sir Austen Chamberlain Received April 22

No 55
Telegraphic *Rome April 21 1926*

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI spoke at Milan to Ambassadors' Council to-day He entered reassuring language to Turkish Government which has given certain amount of uneasiness by reports of aggressive designs by Italy in Asia Minor

Such rumours are baseless and have been given currency to by Greek press for Italian and Jugo-Slav reasons

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No 69

Mr Lindsay (Angora) to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received April 22)

(No 70)
Telegraphic *Constantinople April 21 1926*

MY telegram No 67

I learn from a reliable source that the Russian Ambassador at Angora has left for Moscow to report on the situation there and to receive instructions

I have also been informed by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Turkish Government have received a communication from the Russian Government to the effect that they are prepared to enter into negotiations with Turkey for the conclusion of a treaty of neutrality and non-aggression

The Turkish Government have replied that they are willing to enter into negotiations but that they must first consult the Council of the League of Nations as to the compatibility of the proposed treaty with the Covenant of the League

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

E 2689 62 65

No.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess of Salisbury.

No. 69.

Foreign Office, April 29, 1890.

My Lord,

AT the conversazione with the French Ambassador this night Lord Dufferin mentioned to me that he had received a telegram from Constantinople stating that the Sultan had refused to receive the Armenian deputation which was to have presented a petition to him on the 30th instant, and that they would leave Constantinople the following day. The Ambassador was evidently much annoyed at this unsatisfactory result of the Armenian deputation's journey, and said that this affair might have been settled long ago if the Sultan had only received the deputation when it arrived at Constantinople.

I am, &c.
ARTHUR CHAMBERLAIN

No. 71

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess of Salisbury.

No. 71.

Foreign Office, April 29, 1890.

My Lord,

I HAVE received a report from Consul Biliotti, dated Trebizond, the 21st instant, stating that the Turkish Government have published a decree on the 8th instant to the effect that the Armenian Patriarch, Nerses Varjabedian, who has been residing at Constantinople for the last two years, is to be appointed Archbishop of Trebizond, and that orders have been sent to the Governor-General of Erzeroum to see that the Patriarch proceeds to his destination without delay.

Consul Biliotti adds that the Armenians of Trebizond are much disappointed at the Patriarch's appointment, as they had hoped that he would be allowed to remain at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
ARTHUR CHAMBERLAIN

E 2768 2768 44

No. 72

Sir R. Graham to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (*Received May 1.*)

No. 69. Confidential.

Sir,

Angora, April 20, 1890.

ON the occasion of the Angora Ladies' Society last night Mr. Larmee and Father Lievens each got up a grand dinner, which was a sort of inauguration of the new Ambassy house. The building stands on a rise, and is built of concrete of the usual Levantine type, but pleasing to look at from the outside. Internally it is extremely comfortable, and perhaps more than anything else it gives one the impression that it is a house which has been lived in. Mr. Larmee has been here for the last three years, and has evidently made himself very comfortable. The dinner was a very recherché affair, and the wines were excellent. Mr. Larmee's health was proposed by Father Lievens, and was drunk with much enthusiasm. Mr. Larmee, in returning thanks, said that he had been very happy during his residence at Angora, and that he was sorry to leave it. He was followed by Father Lievens, who proposed the health of the Ambassador, and that of Mr. Blunt, the Consul, and Mr. Wedgwood, the Vice-Consul. Mr. Blunt, in returning thanks, said that he had been very happy during his residence at Angora, and that he was sorry to leave it. He was followed by Father Lievens, who proposed the health of the Ambassador, and that of Mr. Blunt, the Consul, and Mr. Wedgwood, the Vice-Consul. Mr. Blunt, in returning thanks, said that he had been very happy during his residence at Angora, and that he was sorry to leave it. He was followed by Father Lievens, who proposed the health of the Ambassador, and that of Mr. Blunt, the Consul, and Mr. Wedgwood, the Vice-Consul.

Tewfik Bey, I regretted to hear, was ill, and unable to be present. Mr. Blunt, for a person who does not dance, is a modern Turkey is just as strange to me as the Los Angeles. I explained that I had never danced since the days of my youth. Later yet I found myself on Moorish ale with a cross Mr. Blunt, the violinist. I was delighted I found that he had had his musical education at Manchester, and was ultimately accepted with my warmest thanks. I was getting on famously when the Ghazi entered with a lady on his arm. He had been dancing vigorously and looked enormously better for the change. This continued throughout the conversation, at the end of which I had two glasses of champagne before me, when I made a dash for my hat and coat. Mr. Blunt was sent for the carriage, and Mr. Wedgwood, Mr. Blunt, and I started for the Ghazi's house. Mr. Blunt, on arriving at the house, was received by

to the face of the former treaties between Turkey and Albania were severed so that Turkey was free to sign as she did a treaty with Great Britain that her Ministers should make such a request

3 The case is now public There was an exchange of notes between Turkey and Albania over the Turks residing in Albania and Albanians residing in Turkey and finally a certain case has been adopted the nationality of the residence in regard to these persons Such a convention project was prescribed by article 6 of the Lausanne Treaty Despite this the Turkish authorities are now seizing and treating Orthodox Albanians as if they were Greeks and are seizing and handing over to Turkey certain Albanian property The Albanians in question have no right to claim Greek protection by treaty and protests against the action taken have come from Tewfik Rushdi Bey but apparently without success He therefore has now written to his Government suggesting that instead of seizing the property in Albania belonging to Turkish subjects

4 The fact that Mr Noble's instructions were not communicated to him before leaving Angora was no doubt unfortunate but I suspect that Mr Noble's visit to Angora was a strong minister colleagues and that when one of their Turkish colleagues went to the latter's office to discuss the Treaty situation he was told that he had no instructions to deal with the question and that he was to refer to Mr Noble

I have &c
(For the Ambassador)
R V [illegible] PELL

No 74

Sir P Lindsay (Constantinople) to Austen Chamberlain (Received May 6)

(No 110 Telegraphic)

Angora May 5 1926

MY telegram No 114

I received on May 5 National Pact in which boundaries of Turkey are defined as follows

Turkey is composed of districts of Erzerum Sivas Angora Kastamuni Aidin Konia Adana Aleppo Mosul Kirkuk Sulaimania Kerkuk Dyarbekir Urfa Marash Ourfa Mardin Jezireh Nisibin Hakkiari Van Bitlis Muks Erzinjan Gumushane Trebizond Ardahan Kars Artvin Sinope Ismid Brusa Karasi Biga Canik Ismidt Adabazar Afiun Karahissar Eskishehir Kutahia Bolu Kastamuni Kangri Boz-Ok Yozgad Karahissar Kirshehir Nevshehir Kaisari Nigdeh Ak-Serai Kaisari Kirshehir Yozgad Boz-Ok Kangri Kastamuni Bolu Kutahia Eskishehir Afiun Karahissar Adabazar Ismidt Brusa Karasi Biga Canik Ismid Sinope Artvin Kars Ardahan Trebizond Gumushane Erzinjan Muks Bitlis Van Hakkiari Nisibin Jezireh Mardin Ourfa Marash Urfa Dyarbekir Kerkuk Sulaimania Kirkuk Mosul Aleppo Adana Konia Aidin Smyrna Kirklareli Tekirdagh Gallipoli Chanak Bigha Ayvalik Edremid Balikesri Soma Akhisar Manisa Smyrna Aidin Mughla Denizli Isparta Burdur Afiun Karahissar Kutahia Eskishehir Bilejik Angora Yozgad Kirshehir Nevshehir Kaisari Nigdeh Ak-Serai Kaisari Kirshehir Yozgad Angora Bilejik Eskishehir Kutahia Bolu Kastamuni Kangri Boz-Ok Chankiri Yozgad Angora Kastamuni

[illegible] Commissioner at [illegible] of the Dardanelles Zone [illegible] Inter-Allies Council [illegible] Greek Military [illegible] pointed out that to [illegible] Turkish authorities as [illegible] ging to Straits Convention [illegible] last was to be [illegible] and it was later [illegible] vel

As regards [illegible] it [illegible] believed [illegible] got [illegible] has been [illegible] stated. A close reconnaissance [illegible] of the coast both [illegible] has been carried [illegible] weeks or any attempt [illegible] reconnoitre [illegible] does not state if the roads and tracks from the [illegible] Chanak Izmir road [illegible] had also any such possibility [illegible] even [illegible] would not be used for the [illegible] s, but they were covered with wolfs [illegible] grass [illegible] feet [illegible] g

The fact that [illegible] sort of reconnaissance [illegible] of the Turkish [illegible] suspicions as to [illegible] object and as to why there [illegible] such [illegible] front [illegible] was [illegible] a [illegible] easy [illegible] matter [illegible] w [illegible] to [illegible] but the [illegible] ticks [illegible] tra [illegible] forms [illegible] affect [illegible] t [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] construction [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

...ressing the views of His Majesty's Government. I do not propose that Mr. Angora by proceeding to Berlin on the 16th should in any way form part of the Reparations Commission.

The French Government are now considering the proposals contained in the British Government's memorandum, and the settlement of the debt will probably be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the Supreme Council. It was, however, the hope of His Majesty's Government that a definite agreement might be arrived at between the Turkish Government and the Ottoman Public Debt Administration before the meeting of the Supreme Council, so that the proposals for the settlement of the Debt as submitted to the Turkish Delegates at Lausanne might be accepted without further discussion.

I am now ready to open negotiations with the Ottoman Public Debt Administration on the basis of the proposals contained in the memorandum which I handed to the Turkish Delegates at Lausanne on the 4th February last. It is hoped that the proposals will be accepted by the Ottoman Public Debt Administration without further discussion.

I have &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

F E 3104 37 44 N 8.

Cypher telegram (not in cipher) received from Paris.

Sir, 17 Upper Belgrave Street, May 16, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to enclose copy of a memorandum, with which we are entirely in accord, regarding the offer recently put before us by the representatives of the Turkish Government for settlement of the debt charge by the Association Générale de Paris. The memorandum states that His Majesty's Government would be glad if the proposal could be submitted to the Council of Ambassadors at their meeting on the 22nd instant.

I have &c.

JAMES A. COOPER

Secretary.

Enclosure in No. 8.

Memorandum.

WAR loss creditors representatives met in Conference at Lausanne in November last, and on the suggestion of Mr. Grew, the United States Ambassador at Constantinople, who was present at the Conference, addressed a letter to the Turkish Delegation suggesting that the claims of the United States War loss creditors should be submitted to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.

The Turkish Delegation replied that they were prepared to submit the claims of the United States War loss creditors to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, provided that the United States Government would undertake to waive all claims against Turkey in respect of the Army of Occupation in Germany.

The United States Government refused to accept this condition, and the matter was dropped.

The Turkish Delegation have now proposed to put off discussing the claims of the United States War loss creditors, and to proceed with the settlement of the Ottoman Public Debt, which is the subject of the present Conference.

The Turkish Government would be willing to pay the amount due to the United States Government for the settlement of the Debt, as soon as the Ottoman Public Debt Administration has received the sum of £T. 2,000,000 from the Ottoman Government, which is to be paid in accordance with Article 58 of the Treaty of Lausanne.

In addition to the above proposal, the Turkish Delegation have also suggested that the United States Government should forego the interest on the Ottoman Public Debt, which is to be paid to the United States Government in accordance with Article 58 of the Treaty of Lausanne.

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...having agreed to accept a reduction of 40 per cent., which would amount to £T. 2,000,000, and to forego the interest on the balance, which would amount to £T. 1,000,000, the United States Government would be willing to accept the proposal.

The Turkish Delegation have also suggested that the United States Government should forego the interest on the Ottoman Public Debt, which is to be paid to the United States Government in accordance with Article 58 of the Treaty of Lausanne.

In addition to the above proposal, the Turkish Delegation have also suggested that the United States Government should forego the interest on the Ottoman Public Debt, which is to be paid to the United States Government in accordance with Article 58 of the Treaty of Lausanne.

Years	Charges under the Treaty of Lausanne	Amounts which the Representatives of the Associations propose to pay		Amounts offered by the Turkish Government		
		Total	Deficit on charges under the Treaty of Lausanne	Total	Deficit on charges under the Treaty of Lausanne	Deficit on resources under the Treaty of Lausanne
	£T.	£T.	£T.	£T.	£T.	£T.
1923-24	2,500,000	2,500,000	—	1,000,000	1,500,000	1,500,000
1924-25	2,500,000	2,500,000	—	1,000,000	1,500,000	1,500,000
1925-26	2,500,000	2,500,000	—	1,000,000	1,500,000	1,500,000
1926-27	2,500,000	2,500,000	—	1,000,000	1,500,000	1,500,000
1927-28	2,500,000	2,500,000	—	1,000,000	1,500,000	1,500,000

The Turkish Delegation have also suggested that the United States Government should forego the interest on the Ottoman Public Debt, which is to be paid to the United States Government in accordance with Article 58 of the Treaty of Lausanne.

In addition to the above proposal, the

par un accord spécial dans les limites fixées par la législation en vigueur à ces dates, et ne font différend portant sur l'interprétation des clauses des contrats lotissement sera de la compétence exclusive des tribunaux prévus par le Décret de Mustapha et dans les autres contrats

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[E 3194 2739 34 No. 83

Sir P. Loraine to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received May 2)

No. 2. *(Extract)* Sp

Tehran, April 2, 1925.

With reference to your despatch No. 83 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, a translation of the Treaty of Amity concluded between Persia and Turkey on the 22nd of last month. It will be seen that this treaty closely follows the lines of the Russo-Persian Treaty of the 26th December last, and that the most important provisions of the latter are reproduced in the present instrument. The League of Nations is not mentioned, but Article 2 of the Treaty binds the two countries to refrain from any action which may be prejudicial to the interests of the other, and Article 3 provides that neither country will allow its territory to be used for any purpose which may be detrimental to the political, economic or financial interests of the other. Article 4 is a non-aggression clause, and Article 5 prohibits the formation on the territory of either country of any political or military organisation directed against the other.

The new Treaty was signed by Mirza Mahmoud Khan Jahbed, Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and by Tewfik Rouchdi Bey, Turkish Ambassador at Tehran, and was ratified by the Persian Majlis on the 28th ultimo. The Turkish Ambassador left Tehran on the 31st ultimo, and the ratifications were exchanged at Angora on the 1st instant.

The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs explained to me that the Treaty was intended to be a counterpoise to the Russo-Persian Treaty, and that the Persian Government had been careful to avoid any appearance of partiality between Russia and Turkey. He added that the Persian Government had been anxious to conclude a treaty with Turkey before the Russian Ambassador returned to Tehran, as they were afraid that the Russian Government might otherwise put forward claims which would be difficult to resist. The Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the Persian Government had been in communication with the Soviet Government with regard to the Russian claim to the Caspian fisheries, and that he hoped that a satisfactory settlement of this question would be reached shortly. He said that the Persian Government had been unable to accept the Russian contention that the Russo-Persian Treaty of 1921 had been superseded by the Treaty of Moscow of 1st March, 1921, and that the Persian Government had informed the Soviet Government that they were prepared to refer the question to arbitration. The Soviet Government had, however, refused to accept this proposal, and had suggested that the Russo-Persian Treaty of 1921 should be replaced by a new treaty. The Persian Government had, however, refused to accept this suggestion, and had proposed that the Russian claim should be referred

ARTICLE 6.

En vue d'assurer la tranquillité et la sécurité des habitants des zones frontières, les deux parties contractantes prendront toutes les mesures nécessaires pour empêcher que les actes hostiles commis et agissements de nature à porter atteinte à la paix des deux pays et aux relations de bon voisinage entre les tribus se trouvant sur les territoires avoisinant les frontières.

Ces mesures seront prises par les Gouvernements respectifs des deux parties dans l'étendue de leurs territoires et appliquées par les autorités locales compétentes, chaque fois que le besoin s'en fera sentir et que l'une des parties contractantes en jugera la nécessité.

ARTICLE 7.

Les hautes parties contractantes se sont mises d'accord pour conclure, dans le délai plénipotentiaires dans un délai de six mois à partir de la date de la signature du présent traité, une convention commerciale, une convention postale et télégraphique, ainsi que les accords nécessaires pour faciliter le trafic frontalier.

ARTICLE 8.

Les deux parties contractantes se sont mises d'accord pour interpréter la présente convention à recourir en cas de différends à la médiation d'une tierce Puissance amie. Il sera nommé par chacune des parties contractantes un délégué qui sera chargé de régler les différends qui pourraient surgir entre les deux parties contractantes et qui ne pourraient être réglés par la voie diplomatique ordinaire.

ARTICLE 9.

Il est entendu que les engagements mutuels prévus dans le présent traité ne portent aucune atteinte aux droits et obligations découlant pour les hautes parties contractantes de leurs engagements internationaux existants, en ce qui concerne ses relations avec des tierces Puissances.

ARTICLE 10.

Le présent traité a été rédigé en persan, en turc et en français. En cas de divergence c'est le texte français qui fera foi.

ARTICLE 11.

Le présent traité sera soumis, dans le plus bref délai possible, à la approbation des Assemblées nationales des deux États et les ratifications en seront échangées à Téhéran.

Il entrera en vigueur à partir de la date de son échange entre les hautes parties contractantes. Si le traité n'est pas dénoncé par l'une ou l'autre des hautes parties contractantes six mois avant l'expiration de la période de cinq ans, il sera considéré comme ayant été renouvelé tacitement pour une nouvelle période de cinq ans, et ainsi de suite de cinq en cinq ans, à moins qu'il ne soit dénoncé par l'une des parties contractantes six mois avant l'expiration de chaque période de cinq ans.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait en double à Téhéran, le 22 avril 1921.

E 3383/37/44 No. 84

Treasury to Foreign Office — Received June 7

Treasury Chambers, 6th June 1921.

SIR,

I HAVE had the honour to lay before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Mr. Alphabetical letter of the 1st May, and your letters of the 20th and 25th May, with reference to the desire of the French Government that you should make representations to the Turkish Government on the subject of the Ottoman Public Debt.

In reply, I am to observe that the attitude adopted by Sir R. Lindsay in this question, which is referred to in the enclosed reply to the French Government, might

suggest that His Majesty's Government are not greatly interested in securing satisfaction for the bondholders. My Lords would be sorry if such an impression were to be created. While the French holdings of these bonds no doubt exceed the amounts held by British nationals, British bondholders have substantial interests in the Ottoman debt, and are entitled to the fullest support from His Majesty's Government. Further, as my Lords have already had occasion to point out, the general principle of the sanctity of international loan contracts is one which is of special importance to this country in view of the great volume of foreign loans issued in London. Accordingly, their Lordships cannot consider that the settlement by Turkey of her obligations in the matter should be regarded as primarily a French interest, and I am to say that, so far as my Lords are concerned, nothing would be further from their wish than that His Majesty's Government should agree to any settlement which is not in accordance with the principles which they have always maintained in this matter.

It is of course the case that Turkey is not likely to receive further credits from the London market until the question of the outstanding loans has been settled, and my Lords are glad to note that the Secretary of State has discussed this with M. Fleuriau on the 17th May, since it is clearly desirable that the French Government should be left under no unnecessary misapprehension on this point. My Lords are not aware that Russia, France's partner in the Ottoman loans, has any such British holders of Russian bonds to consider.

Apart from this aspect of the matter, I am to point out that the presidency of the Ottoman Public Debt Council is held alternately by the British and French members, and my Lords understand that Sir Alan Anderson's present term of office will expire in the autumn of this year. It would be difficult for His Majesty's Government to withdraw from the French Government the support which Sir Alan Anderson's appointment has received, in the interests of the British bondholders, without serious risk of [illegible].

Accordingly, their Lordships are not satisfied that the fact of Turkey's obligations to the Ottoman Public Debt Council is a sufficient reason why the Turkish Government should not be asked to make some settlement with the bondholders, and my Lords would be glad to learn what action the Secretary of State proposes to take in the matter. The Turkish Government have, moreover, specifically undertaken, in the Treaty of Lausanne, to enter into negotiations with the Council of the League of Nations for the settlement of the Ottoman Public Debt, and it is important that this undertaking should be carried out.

My Lords understand that a copy of the correspondence between Sir A. Chamberlain and the French Ambassador of the 12th May and the 10th May, the Foreign Office letter of the 13th May, and the reply to the French Government of the 30th April, have been sent to the Paris Government, but they would be glad to be informed whether the French proposals to the Turkish Government will be agreed upon before the latter are communicated to the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.
(for) E. MEMPHEN.

E 3470/59/44 No. 86

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain — Received June 7.

(No. 317.)

His Majesty's Consul-General at Erzerum presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of report No. 20 from His Majesty's Consul, Trebizond, dated the 19th May, respecting [illegible].

Constantinople, June 20, 1921.

Enclosure in No. 85.

Consul Knight to Sir R. Lindsay.

(No. 20.)

Trebizond, May 31, 1926.

Sir,

NEWS has only quite recently reached here of the execution at Angora of Omer Effend, one of the best known and most respected Turkish merchants, and two other prominent citizens. Public opinion is greatly shocked, but of course, finds no expression. Deceased were apparently accused of complicity in a mysterious murder recently committed in this neighbourhood, but are considered to have been really victims of their political opinion. It is said that permission to bring bodies to Trebizond was refused. They were friends of the ex-Vali Hamid who at present might be in great danger.

I have, &c.
W. L. C. KNIGHT

[E 3486/708/44, No. 86

Mr. Erskine to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received June 7.)

(No. 87.)

Sofia, June 2, 1926.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 87 of the 20th May, I have the honour to report that the Turco-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship, and Annexes were laid before the Sobranje on the 20th May and ratified after a single reading on the 27th May.

2. These instruments,* copies of which I have the honour to enclose, are essentially as reported at the time of their signature (see Mr. Stevenson's despatch No. 227 of the 22nd October, 1925, Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 802 of the 24th October, 1925, and my despatch No. 244 of the 19th November, 1925) and consist of—

(1.) A Treaty of Friendship, between which is foreshadowed the future conclusion of commercial and consular conventions and declares amnesty for outstanding questions;

(2.) A supplementary protocol dealing with minority rights, patriarchy and the property of emigrants;

(3.) A letter addressed by M. Kalfoff to Tewfik Kiazim Bey and forming an integral part of the protocol; and

(4.) The establishment of a mixed arbitral tribunal as mentioned above.

3. The position in regard to the treaty and its annexes at the moment when the Social Democratic Society was constituted up to the point of ratification, and it was decided to send a telegraphic protest on the subject to the League of Nations. Though they were unable to say approval by the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs on the 21st May, they were received by a majority of votes on the 26th and 27th May in the Sobranje. The chief cause of the protest was the exclusion from Eastern Thrace of Bulgarian nationality since the 1st December, 1913, declared from entering therein and their properties confiscated by the Turkish State without compensation, which article the object of attempts as a reprisal to secure therefor to Bulgarians as well as to the Thracians who expect to sort of adequate compensation from the proceeds of abandoned Turkish property in the same category in this country.

4. A notable speech was made by M. Pastoukhoff, leader of the Social Democrats, who denounced the treaty as a blow at the interests of Bulgaria. They had accepted a regime of the treatment of minorities a principle first enunciated in the Treaty of Bucharest imposed by Turkey on a defeated Greece and involving conditions of comparatively less favourable to Bulgaria than those accorded to her by the Treaty of Constantinople after her defeat in 1913. It was a bad international

* Not printed.

precedent. Even the establishment convention was unsatisfactory, as it contained no provision for such essential advantages as schools and churches. He considered in short that the clauses of the treaty were thoroughly inequitable, and while discouraging any but the most friendly and loyal regards for Turkey and the Moslem minorities in Bulgaria, he begged the Government to find some means of withdrawing a measure which it found itself unable to support.

5. M. Kalfoff as the Minister for Foreign Affairs responsible for the conclusion of the treaty and the President of the Council wound up the debate in a conciliatory note. Turkey said M. Kalfoff after the sufferings of her wars in Asia Minor had been in a position to obtain concessions and terms from great Powers which were not the present signatories represented the fruit of two years and more negotiations on the Bulgarian side. It was to the most that could be expected, and did possess some very substantial advantages. The refugees from the Maritza and Constantinople and Thrace would, long before 1942 would be enabled to return to their properties, and the establishment of the mixed tribunal would decide the future position of Bulgarians in Turkey. The treaty had regulated outstanding questions and prepared the way for the development of neighbourly relations between the two States. It was also the great merit of suppressing the special privileges accorded by the Treaty of Constantinople to the Moslem elements in Bulgaria.

6. M. Liaptcheff without gainsaying the very great importance of the expressed satisfaction that the conclusion of the treaty would result in the removal of many causes of friction between Turkey and Bulgaria, and the Moslems in the latter country would now recognise that they had a duty as well as rights to perform as loyal Bulgarian subjects. The treaty was not to be considered as a definitive settlement of all questions between the two countries, but as a step in the right direction. The new treaty would be followed by a commercial treaty, the Socialists and almost all other questions outstanding.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM ERSKINE.

E 3525/1199/89, No. 87

The Marquess of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 1.)

Paris, June 7, 1926.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 1291 of the 28th April regarding the negotiations in progress between the French and Turkish Governments, I have the honour to inform you that it is reported in the newspapers that the Franco-Turkish Treaty was signed at Angora a few days ago.

2. The text of the treaty has not yet been published in Paris but, according to the *Temps* of the 4th June, it must be considered primarily as a complement to the treaty of 1921, the principal provisions of which it is intended to facilitate. The new treaty likewise provides for the rectification of certain portions of the frontier between Syria and Turkey, contains reciprocal guarantees of non-aggression and provides that disputes which may arise between Turkey and Syria shall be settled by means of arbitration. The *Temps* emphasises the fact that these articles, like the new treaty which alters the frontier, provide for reciprocal neutrality do not in any way conflict with the obligations of the French Government to the League of Nations as the mandatory Power in Syria, or to Great Britain with which France has undertaken to work in close collaboration in the Near East.

3. The author of the article in the *Temps* welcomes the signature of the treaty as being the first step towards the consolidation of the position in the Near East and he regards it as a striking proof of the progress which has been made between His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government since the settlement of the Mosul question. The satisfactory solution of this matter, it says, he added, will be followed by an improved

4 Mr Bro[illegible] s[illegible]mmoned Mr Phipps to say to him that a copy of the treaty [illegible] always take [illegible]ng necessary to make [illegible]w observations on the text thereof

I have &c.
(REW)

E 3623 62 65 No 98

Sir R Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received June 14)

(No 279)
Sir *Constantinople, June 9, 1920*

I HAVE [illegible] to instruct [illegible] Mr Peel to take [illegible] from the Turkish Minister

2 [illegible] that [illegible] desire [illegible] In that the [illegible] took the [illegible] was anxious that there [illegible] should [illegible] the [illegible] for [illegible] that [illegible] Majesty's [illegible] Government [illegible] Assistant [illegible] Mr Peel [illegible] that [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

represented by Turkey. ... that trade relations may be restricted. At the present moment Swiss exporters are having considerable difficulties with Turkish customs, this being one of the points to be settled by M. Moriaud. At the same time the Swiss Legation and Legation of Angora exert their reputation to Turkey. This assistance is by no means negligible, as is shown by the fact that a number of Swiss citizens have been admitted to the Turkish official administrative posts, ... Djelal Bey, the Vali of Aidin (Smyrna), was a Swiss. ... this connection it may be of interest to note that the "Bank für Orient" in Zurich, not only has a branch in Angora, but has also financed ... railway ... of Swiss capital. ... Ismet Pasha, ... Minister of Public Works, is a Swiss subject. ... Mr. Hilbert, ... Mr. Bagge, ... Swiss ... engineers ... the Turkish State Railways. ... Professor Sarasin ... the Turkish Government to be Turkish subjects, ... the Swiss Consul-General in Turkey ... Swiss citizen, and it is stated that nobody ... Turkish ... Swiss ... will be ... very ... welcome ... Ismet Pasha ... will be ... very ... welcome ... Ismet Pasha ... will be ... very ... welcome ... Ismet Pasha

...Repu... française d... ...ent... ...e conclure une convention à cet effet.

Et ont désigné pour ... plénipotentiaires, ...

Son Excellence Tewfik Bey ... Bey, Ministre des Affaires étrangères de l'Empire ottoman,

et

Son Excellence M. ... Ministre, Haut Commissaire de la République française en Syrie et au Liban,

Lesquels, après ... ...connus en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

Article 1

La République française et l'Empire ottoman ... sous la garantie de la République française et de son ...

Ils s'engagent à ... frontière comme ... précédemment définie par le procès-verbal ... Article 2 ci-après, et à ... les règles de la bonne ... qui ... entre ... ...

Article 2

Dans ... ...ois ... la présente convention, une commission ... ...ra ... ...ra ... ...ra

Article 12

L'organisation de la Police des zones détachées de l'Empire ottoman et placées sous [illegible] française sera soumise aux dispositions des conventions et actes internationaux [illegible] aux hautes parties contractantes [illegible] adhéré et qui [illegible] à Paris le 19 janvier 1912.

Les deux hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à prendre les mesures nécessaires en vue d'empêcher [illegible] et contagieuses [illegible] Des mesures sanitaires semblables seront prises [illegible] pour accompagner [illegible] contre l'invasion des sauterelles.

En cas de disette générale, [illegible] les deux hautes parties contractantes s'entendront à prix réduit [illegible] frontières [illegible] contagieuses l'exportation [illegible] respectives. Les mêmes autorités se tiendront [illegible] sanitaire des troupes [illegible]

Article 13

Par application de la note [illegible] Angora le 30 octobre 1921, le territoire sera entièrement [illegible] de la Syrie jusqu'à [illegible] permettra [illegible] Kurdes [illegible] le Kurdistan [illegible] coopérant [illegible] des deux nations.

Le Gouvernement turc [illegible] engage à [illegible] progrès.

Article 14.

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à régler par les moyens pacifiques [illegible] qui viendrait à s'élever entre elles et dont la solution n'aurait pu être réglée par la voie diplomatique ordinaire.

Le différend sera porté devant une commission mixte composée chaque fois [illegible] par un délégué [illegible] respectifs et [illegible] à différend, les délégués [illegible] à constituer [illegible] à cet effet. Les membres [illegible] désignés comme [illegible] par les sujets des pays [illegible].

Les [illegible] de régler le différend à l'amiable [illegible] à la Cour de La Haye suivant les [illegible] procédure [illegible] sauvegarde à la Cour de La Haye suivant les règles de la procédure arbitrale [illegible] les deux parties.

Les parties contractantes [illegible] les litiges [illegible] concernant les questions [illegible] souveraineté [illegible] territoriales [illegible] règles du droit international.

Article 15.

La présente convention [illegible] ratifiée aussitôt que faire se pourra. Les instruments de ratification seront échangés à Angora.

Article 16

La présente convention entrera en vigueur dès [illegible] mettra sa ratification [illegible] une période [illegible] cinq ans.

Par la suite, la convention [illegible] année [illegible] pour une période [illegible] pas [illegible] l'une [illegible] ans à partir pour la dénoncer [illegible] les deux parties contractantes [illegible] pas [illegible] l'une [illegible] nous a été soumis.

En foi de quoi [illegible] Docteur Tewfik Rouchdi Bey, Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République [illegible], Député [illegible] Smyrne, et Son Excellence M. Albert Sarraut, [illegible] Ministre d'Etat, Ambassadeur de France en Turquie, [illegible] pouvoirs [illegible], ont signé la présente convention.

Fait à Angora [illegible] mai 1926.

Dr. ROUCHDI — A. SARRAUT

Convention de Commerce et de Navigation

La présente convention [illegible] autre part [illegible] droits et obligations résultant pour les deux hautes parties contractantes du Traité de Lausanne du 24 juillet 1923 et des engagements [illegible] contractés [illegible] antérieurement au 18 février 1926.

Il demeure entendu que la procédure d'arbitrage [illegible] article 4 de la convention pour le règlement pacifique [illegible] tous les différends pouvant s'élever entre les deux hautes parties contractantes s'appliquera [illegible] aux différends [illegible] interprétation [illegible] présente convention [illegible] ses annexes.

Fait à Angora [illegible] 1926.

Dr. ROUCHDI — A. SARRAUT

Les [illegible] conventions [illegible] note de ce jour sont [illegible] ainsi conçu :

[illegible] Ambassade [illegible] avoir [illegible] présence ses travaux [illegible] Paris, [illegible] intérêts [illegible] Turquie [illegible] part [illegible] Sa Majesté le Roi [illegible] Bey [illegible].

Quand [illegible] cette lettre [illegible] Excellence [illegible] ses vœux [illegible] partant de Turquie [illegible] vous [illegible] inscrire.

Fait à Angora, le 30 mai 1926.

Dr. ROUCHDI — A. SARRAUT

[illegible] annexe [illegible] protocole N° 3 [illegible] présente convention [illegible] rédigé [illegible] suit :

Article

Les [illegible] convention [illegible] article 7 [illegible] appliquer [illegible] le plus [illegible] de [illegible] le [illegible] garantie qui sera [illegible] sur leur territoire. Les [illegible] de la part [illegible] pourront [illegible] leurs [illegible] le caractère [illegible].

Article 4

Au cas [illegible] plusieurs [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] frontière [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

11. Par une ligne partant du sommet de Kizil Kaya, suivant le thalweg dirigé nord-sud jusqu'au point situé à 3 kilomètres au sud de ce sommet (point de rencontre avec le sentier allant de Sogle à Kuchuk Yaila),
12. Par une ligne partant de ce point et se dirigeant vers le sud-est jusqu'au sommet situé à 1,000 mètres sud-est de Sogle,
13. Par une ligne partant de ce dernier sommet et suivant la ligne de faîte de direction est-ouest jusqu'au point de rencontre avec le chemin de Kassaba à Hadjar pour gagner ensuite la ligne droite le sommet de Karadjik Tepessi,
14. Par la ligne droite partant de Kuladjik Tepessi et atteignant le poste Hadjar Keui Pounar

Du point de la cote définie ci-dessus par une ligne droite sensiblement ouest-est rejoignant l'origine d'un petit ravin de direction générale Hadjar Medan Ekrem jusqu'à ce qu'elle se croise avec la piste Hassa Chetek et de Ismail Hoyuk par 340,

16. De ce dernier point ci-dessus par une ligne droite orientée Hadjar Medan Ekrem jusqu'au point où elle rencontre la route de Hassa à Isalé, l'axe de la petite vallée étant la ligne frontière,
17. Par cette route sensiblement nord-est-sud-ouest de ce dernier point sommet du mamelon de Boz Tepe,
18. Par une droite allant du sommet du mamelon de Boz-Tepe au point d'intersection de la route Kara Boreci
19. De ce point ci-dessus par la route allant de Kara Boreci presque directement au thalweg de Kotchan
20. Par ce thalweg de Kotchan jusqu'au point où il coupe la route Kara Boreci-Isalé, point le plus haut de la crête,
21. De ce point ci-dessus de la crête en ligne droite jusqu'à 500 mètres environ à l'est de la grande route de 3,000 mètres aboutissant au Syrie Tchesmé d'Akkar Bey Oden Perli,
22. Du point situé à 1 kilomètre au nord de Akkar Bey Oden Perli se dirigeant vers le Beyuk Darrek cote 1250 et se prolongeant vers ce dernier point jusqu'à la rencontre du Beyuk Kedy Sirt Pertoukli Tchiftlik,
23. Du point cote 8 ci-dessus par la route reliant la piste Bab Kara Saad à Kara Ibrahim et de là sur le sommet Kotchanli,
24. De ce dernier point ci-dessus par une ligne droite allant au point cote 661,
25. Du point cote 661 par une ligne droite allant au point cote 682,
26. Du point cote 682 par la ligne de crête jusqu'à l'affluent des deux thalwegs issus de la cote 682 et allant vers l'est,
27. De ce point ci-dessus, par le thalweg supérieur de Sabrane Soryou
28. Du point ci-dessus par le cours de Sabrane Soryou jusqu'au confluent de cette rivière et du thalweg situé à 2 kilomètres au sud de Hadjar Keui,
29. De ce confluent ci-dessus par le thalweg jusqu'à la piste de Medan Chantal
3. Du point ci-dessus par la piste allant à Chaltat jusqu'au croisement de la piste allant à Akalan passant à Djeni Tepe
4. De ce croisement par la piste allant à Yeni Keui jusqu'à l'Afin Soryou,
32. Du point ci-dessus par l'Afin Soryou jusqu'au confluent de l'Ak Dan Deressi,
33. De ce confluent par le cours de l'Ak Dan Deressi jusqu'au croisement de la piste allant de Karabela à la Dane,
34. De ce croisement par la ligne de faîte ci-dessus vers le sud-est et aboutissant au point cote 10-
35. De ce point ci-dessus au point d'intersection du ravin d'Egri-Kane et de la ligne droite 702 73,
36. De ce point en remontant le ravin d'Egri-Kane jusqu'à son origine
37. De ce point jusqu'à l'origine du ravin aboutissant au sommet de Mahal Dagh de Kara Bach
38. De ce point en suivant le ravin susdit jusqu'au croisement avec le sentier allant du sud de Ibrahim Talita (D),
39. De ce point à suivre le crête aboutissant au sommet de Chaga Tepe
40. Par la ligne droite joignant le sommet de Tchaga Tepé au point situé à 200 mètres au sud d'Utch Evler
41. De ce point par une ligne droite orientée sud aboutissant au sommet de Sabar Kaya

42. Par la ligne droite ouest-est partant de ce sommet jusqu'au carrefour de chemins 500 mètres sud-est de Kara Kouyou ;
43. Par le chemin de Kara Kouyou à Tibil (T) jusqu'au carrefour environ 1 kilom. est de Yazi Baghi ;
44. De ce point par le chemin nord-sud jusqu'au carrefour à environ 1 kilom. sud du premier ;
45. De ce point par la ligne de plus grande pente aboutissant à la route Azaz-Killis au point situé à 800 mètres au sud de Tibil ;
46. De ce point par la route Azaz-Killis (T) vers le nord jusqu'au ponceau 600 mètres au nord-ouest d'Armoudja ;
47. De ce point en remontant vers le nord la route (T) de Killis jusqu'à un point situé à 400 mètres au nord du ponceau susdit ;
48. De ce point par une ligne sensiblement est-ouest jusqu'à sa rencontre avec le ruisseau coulant vers Chamrin et Bretché ;
49. De ce point par le lit du ruisseau susdit jusqu'à son croisement avec les sentiers venant de Chamrin et de Tel-es-Cham ;
50. De ce point par le sentier venant de Tel-es-Cham et se dirigeant sensiblement vers le nord-est jusqu'à sa rencontre avec le sentier reliant Kafer Tchoch à Killis ;
51. De ce point par le sentier se dirigeant vers Kafer Tchoch jusqu'à hauteur du mamelon 700 mètres sud-ouest de Kafer Harim ;
52. Par la ligne droite de direction sud-est allant de ce mamelon à un point situé dans le ravin de Kafer Harim à 1 kilom. sud de ce village ;
53. De ce point par une ligne sensiblement droite se dirigeant vers le nord-est jusqu'au carrefour environ 700 mètres ouest de Saïve ;
54. De ce point en descendant vers l'est par le ruisseau Suep jusqu'au coude qu'il fait pour se diriger vers le sud ;
55. De ce coude par une ligne ouest-est jusqu'à la route Saïve (T) Hamili (T) ;
56. De ce point en suivant la route Saïve Hamili (T) jusqu'à 1 kilom. environ au sud-est de Hamili ;
57. Du point ci-dessus vers le nord par le sentier Kara-Mezra-Hafsa jusqu'à un point situé à 800 mètres du premier ;
58. De ce point par une droite allant à un point situé à 1,200 mètres de Bighéidine sur la piste allant de ce village vers le nord-est ;
59. Du point ci-dessus par une droite allant au point situé sur la piste Kutchuk Bikir à Tathamos et à 150 mètres au sud du ruisseau coupant cette piste ;
60. Du point ci-dessus par une droite allant à un point situé à 300 mètres au sud de Tchildiraba et sur la piste allant de ce village à Tathamos ;
61. Du point ci-dessus par une droite allant à la croisée des pistes situées à 800 mètres au sud-ouest de Saltuan ;
62. De la croisée ci-dessus par une droite allant jusqu'au monticule rocheux coté 487 ;
63. Du monticule ci-dessus par une droite allant à la croisée des chemins située à 1,000 mètres à l'est ;
64. De la croisée ci-dessus par la piste allant vers l'est du mamelon voisin de la station de Tchoban Bey et la station. La station elle-même étant en territoire turc, la localité en territoire syrien.

DEUXIÈME SECTEUR.—*De la Station de Tchoban-Bey à Nousseibine.*

La frontière suivra la voie ferrée de Bagdad dont la plateforme restera sur le territoire turc jusqu'à Mousseibine.

Les stations et gares de la section entre Tchoban-Bey et Nousseibine ainsi que toutes les installations actuelles servant à l'exploitation de la voie appartiendront à la Turquie comme faisant partie de la plateforme du chemin de fer.

Seront considérées comme emprises de la voie ferrée les balastières nécessaires à l'exploitation de cette voie qui seront déterminées dans le plus bref délai possible par les délégués des Ministères des Travaux publics des deux pays.

La Turquie et la Syrie auront l'usage commun du port de Djerablous et de la voie le reliant à la gare de cette localité. Le territoire limité par la ligne principale et l'embranchement reliant la gare de Djerablous au port fluvial sera considéré au point de vue douanier comme zone franche.

Une gare fluviale internationale sera établie au port de Djerablous.

TROISIÈME SECTEUR.—*De Nousseibine à Djezireh-ibn-Omar.*

La frontière suivra la vieille route entre Nousseibine et Djezireh-ibn-Omar, où elle rejoindra le Tigre.

La Commission d'Abornement sera chargée de déterminer cette route.

Les localités de Nousseibine et de Djezireh-ibn-Omar ainsi que la route resteront à la Turquie, mais les deux pays auront les mêmes droits pour l'utilisation de cette route.

La Commission d'Abornement commencera ses travaux quinze jours après la ratification de la présente convention de Tchoban-Bey à la mer.

Quand l'abornement de ce premier secteur sera terminé, elle reprendra ses travaux en partant de Tchoban-Bey vers Nousseibine.

PROTOCOLE-ANNEXE 2.

Extradition.

ARTICLE 1er.

Les deux hautes parties contractantes se livreront réciproquement, sur demande, à l'exception de leurs nationaux, les individus qui, étant poursuivis ou condamnés par les autorités judiciaires de l'une d'elles pour des crimes ou délits de droit commun également passibles dans les deux pays d'une peine supérieure à six mois de prison, se réfugieraient sur le territoire de l'autre. Les frais d'arrestation, de détention et de transport seront à la charge de la partie requérante.

L'extradition n'aura pas lieu pour crime ou délit politique. Ne sera pas réputé crime ou délit politique l'attentat contre la vie du chef d'État ou des membres de sa famille.

L'extradition ne sera pas accordée lorsque, d'après la loi de l'une des deux parties, l'action pénale est prescrite.

Aucune personne extradée ne sera poursuivie ou punie pour une infraction commise avant la demande d'extradition autre que celle pour laquelle l'extradition a été accordée.

ARTICLE 2.

Les demandes d'extradition seront présentées avec tous les documents judiciaires établissant la nature du crime ou délit par la voie diplomatique régulière. Toutefois, en ce qui concerne les demandes d'extradition formulées par le Gouvernement turc, il est admis qu'elles pourront être présentées par l'entremise du consulat général de Turquie à Beyrouth au Haut-Commissariat de la République française. Ces demandes, pour ce qui a trait à la qualification à donner au crime ou délit, pourront être examinées par telle autorité administrative ou judiciaire à la convenance de l'État requis, sous que celui-ci puisse arguer de cet examen pour différer sa réponse au delà d'un délai de cinq mois à dater de la présentation de la demande. Tout refus devra être motivé.

Si la personne dont l'extradition est demandée fait l'objet d'une action judiciaire ou se trouve sous le coup d'une condamnation dans le pays où elle s'est réfugiée, l'extradition pourra être différée jusqu'à la clôture de la procédure pénale ou l'expiration de la peine.

ARTICLE 3.

Lorsque la mise sous la surveillance de police d'une personne sera requise avant que la demande d'extradition ait été formulée, la requête nécessaire sera présentée par voie diplomatique ou par l'entremise du consulat général de Turquie à Beyrouth.

La surveillance de police ne pourra excéder un délai de trois mois, si une demande régulière d'extradition n'a pas été présentée dans ce délai.

PROTOCOLE-ANNEXE 3.

Surveillance de la Frontière.

ARTICLE 1er.

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent réciproquement à s'opposer, par tous les moyens en leur pouvoir, aux préparatifs d'un ou plusieurs individus armés dans le but de se livrer à des actes de pillage ou de banditisme dans la zone frontière voisine et à les empêcher de franchir la frontière.

ARTICLE 2.

Quand les autorités compétentes désignées à l'article 7 apprendront que des préparatifs sont faits par un ou plusieurs individus armés dans le but de se livrer à des actes de pillage ou de banditisme dans la zone frontière voisine, elles devront s'en aviser réciproquement et sans délai.

ARTICLE 3.

Les autorités compétentes désignées à l'article 7 s'avertiront réciproquement et le plus vite possible de tout acte de pillage et de brigandage qui serait commis sur leur territoire et s'efforceront par tous les moyens en leur pouvoir d'empêcher leurs auteurs de franchir la frontière.

ARTICLE 4.

Au cas où un ou plusieurs individus armés, ayant accompli un crime ou délit dans la zone frontière voisine, réussiraient à se réfugier dans l'autre zone frontière, les autorités de cette dernière zone sont tenues d'arrêter ces individus pour les mettre, conformément à la loi, à la disposition des autorités judiciaires avec leur butin et leurs armes.

ARTICLE 5.

Les hautes parties contractantes se remettront réciproquement, le cas échéant, les individus arrêtés, dans les conditions indiquées par le protocole d'extradition, annexé à la présente convention de bon voisinage.

ARTICLE 6.

La zone frontière dans laquelle cette convention s'appliquera sera toute la frontière qui sépare la Turquie de la Syrie ainsi qu'une zone de 50 kilom. en profondeur de part et d'autre de cette frontière.

ARTICLE 7.

Les autorités compétentes chargées de l'application de cette convention sont les suivantes :

Pour l'organisation de la collaboration :

Du côté turc : le commissaire militaire de la frontière ;
Du côté français : le général commandant la région d'Alep.

Pour chacune de leur région :

Du côté turc, avec le consentement des Valis :

1. Le Kaïmakam de Dert Yol ;
2. Le Kaïmakam de Khassa ;
3. Le Commandant du Poste de Gulguman ;
4. Le Kaïmakam de Killis ;
5. Le Mudir d'Agatche Kouyoun ;
6. Le Commandant du Poste de Gendarmerie de Kersen Tache ;
7. Le Kaïmakam de Biredjik ;
8. Le Kaïmakam de Seroudj ;
9. Le Kaïmakam de Raz-ul-Ain ;
10. Le Kaïmakam de Nissibine ;
11. Le Vali de Hardine.

Du côté français :

1. Le Commandant des Troupes d'Alexandrette ;
2. L'Officier du Service des Renseignements de Kirik Khan ;
3. Le Commandant du Poste de Gendarmerie d'Hadjilar ;
4. Le Commandant du Poste de Gendarmerie mobile de Radjou ;
5. Le Commandant du Poste de Katma ;
6. L'Officier du Service des Renseignements d'Azaz ;
7. Le Commandant du Poste de Gendarmerie de Sadjour ;
8. Le Commandant du Poste de Djerablous ;
9. Le Commandant du Poste de Tell Abiad ;
10. Le Commandant du Poste de Gendarmerie d'Arab Punar ;
11. Le Commandant du Poste de Raz-ul-Ain ;
12. L'Officier du Service des Renseignements d'Hassetche.

ARTICLE 8.

En tenant compte de la délimitation définitive de la frontière turco-syrienne, les hautes parties contractantes désigneront ou créeront des caracols comme portes-frontières et s'engagent réciproquement à empêcher l'entrée et la sortie sur tout autre point de la zone frontière.

Les emplacements de ces caracols, qui seront créés, s'il y a lieu, au fur et à mesure des nécessités ou des disponibilités, seront choisis par chaque autorité sur son propre territoire et de telle façon qu'à un caracol turc corresponde un caracol syrien ou inversement.

ARTICLE 9.

(i.) Au cas où une tribu turque ayant droit coutumier de pacage de Syrie désirerait passer en territoire syrien, le chef en avisera quinze jours à l'avance les autorités turques de la frontière et leur donnera les indications suivantes :

(*a.*) Le nombre d'hommes de la tribu ;
(*b.*) Le point par où elle passera la frontière ;
(*c.*) Le lieu et la durée de son séjour en Syrie.

(ii.) Si les autorités de la zone frontière turque permettent le passage, elles doivent fournir aux autorités de la zone syrienne les renseignements ci-dessus.

(iii.) De même, les tribus ayant le droit coutumier de pacage en Turquie et désirant passer en territoire turc doivent accomplir les mêmes formalités dans les mêmes conditions.

ARTICLE 10.

Les mesures restrictives mentionnées aux articles 8 et 9 ne porteront pas atteinte aux droits acquis par l'article 13 de l'Accord d'Angora du 20 octobre 1921.

PROTOCOLE-ANNEXE 4.

Transports civils par la Voie Bozanti–Nisaibine.

ARTICLE 1er.

La formalité du visa du passeport est abrogée pour les voyageurs turcs transitant par voie ferrée sans quitter en aucun moment les emprises du chemin de fer pour pénétrer en territoire syrien entre Meidan-Ekbès et Tchoban-Bey, et pour les voyageurs syro-libanais transitant par voie ferrée, sans quitter en aucun moment les emprises du chemin de fer pour pénétrer en territoire turc, entre Tchoban-Bey et Nissibine.

ARTICLE 2.

Le personnel turc et syrien du chemin de fer Bozanti-Nissibine sera muni de pièces d'identité (" vessika ") délivrées par la direction de la compagnie selon la formule à déterminer par la commission ci-dessous indiquée et visées gratuitement par le consul de la République française à Adana pour le personnel turc et par le consul de la République turc à Alep pour le personnel syrien.

ARTICLE 3.

Dans le mois qui suivra la signature de la présente convention, une commission composée des délégués des deux parties se réunira à Alep. Elle fixera la rédaction des vessikas susmentionnés ; elle précisera les modalités de circulation et les conditions de stationnement aux arrêts obligatoires du personnel sur tout le parcours du chemin de fer, soit en territoire turc, soit en territoire syrien.

ARTICLE 4.

Un délégué du directeur de la compagnie sera admis à présenter à la commission toutes suggestions concernant les questions qu'elle aura à traiter.

PROTOCOLE-ANNEXE 5.

Transports militaires par la Voie ferrée Bozanti-Nissibine.

En exécution de l'article 10 de l'Accord d'Angora, qui prévoit que :

" La Turquie aura le droit de faire ses transports militaires par chemin de fer Meïdan-Ekbès à Tchoban-Bey dans la région syrienne et la Syrie aura le droit de faire ses transports militaires par chemin de fer de Tchoban-Bey jusqu'à Nissibine dans le territoire turc,"

et de la note signée le 20 octobre 1921 par MM. Youssouf Kemal Bey et Franklin-Bouillon spécifiant que :

" Les plénipotentiaires des deux parties ont également reconnu la nécessité de donner de part et d'autre un préavis suffisant toutes les fois que l'un des deux pays se trouvera dans le cas de faire usage de la faculté mentionnée à l'article 10, alinéa 2, de l'accord turco-français."

Les transports militaires s'effectueront d'après le protocole suivant :

ARTICLE 1er.

Transports par Trains militaires.

Les transports importants, soit de troupes, soit de matériel (matériel de guerre, armes, munitions, avions, &c., et approvisionnements militaires de toutes sortes) ainsi que les transports mixtes (troupes et matériel) nécessitant la mise en marche d'un train complet feront l'objet, de la part soit du Gouvernement turc, soit du Haut-Commissariat français en Syrie et au Liban, d'un préavis télégraphique de cinq jours auprès des autorités qualifiées des Gouvernements intéressés, indiquant le nombre de trains et de wagons et de voitures par chaque train.

La voie la plus courte sera utilisée, les horaires fixés par les chemins de fer Cilicie-Nord-Syrie ne devront comporter que les arrêts strictement indispensables au service de la traction. Les transports turcs ayant à passer par Muslimié continueront directement sans transiter par Alep.

ARTICLE 2.

Transports militaires supérieurs à deux Wagons complets mais non par Trains militaires.

Ces transports donneront lieu de la part soit du Gouvernement de la République turque, soit du Haut-Commissariat français en Syrie et au Liban, à un préavis télégraphique de quarante-huit heures, indiquant le nombre de wagons ou voitures.

Les wagons seront accrochés aux trains réguliers ou facultatifs.

Lors du passage de détachements turcs en territoire syrien la voie la plus courte sera utilisée. C'est ainsi que ces transports seront assurés directement de Meïdan-Ekbès à Tchoban-Bey et *vice versâ* par Muslimié sans qu'aucun officier ou homme de troupe puisse prétendre aller jusqu'à Alep.

Les détachements ne séjourneront à Muslimié que durant l'arrêt nécessaire aux correspondances, ils resteront logés dans leurs wagons, ils ne pourront sortir des emprises de la gare.

De même, les militaires français au syriens ne pourront séjourner dans une gare turque de bifurcation que durant l'intervalle de temps prévu par les horaires des correspondances ; ils ne pourront, en territoire turc, quitter les emprises du chemin de fer pour pénétrer plus avant en territoire turc ; ils pourront toutefois, là où la voie ferrée sert de frontière pénétrer en territoire syrien.

Le délai du préavis commence à partir du moment où il parvient à l'autorité qui est qualifiée pour le recevoir.

L'autorité qui a qualité pour recevoir ce préavis est le commissaire militaire du chemin de fer soit turc à Adana, soit français à Alep.

Celui-ci doit donner accusé de réception de ce préavis dans les six heures qui soivent l'arrivée de ce préavis télégraphique à la localité où il se trouve (Adana ou Alep). Dans

tous les cas, le délai du préavis doit commencer six heures après la réception de celui-ci par la gare de la localité du commissaire intéressé et à l'expiration du préavis les transports doivent commencer.

Le préavis est donné par l'intermédiaire des commissaires militaires intéressés turc ou français.

ARTICLE 3.

Transports militaires de deux Wagons ou Voitures au maximum.

Ces transports s'effectueront par trains réguliers ou facultatifs.

Ils ne donneront pas lieu à préavis.

Toutefois, il reste entendu que, comme pour les autres cas, la voie la plus courte sera seule utilisée.

Notamment lors des transports effectués sur la partie Meïdan-Ekbès-Tchoban-Bey, tous les militaires turcs devant s'arrêter à Muslimié, aucun d'entre eux (officiers compris) ne pourra se rendre à Alep. Les détachements ne pourront quitter les emprises de la gare de Muslimié, où, dans un esprit de cordiale entente, il sera aménagé par les autorités françaises un dortoir pour les hommes et une chambre de passage convenablement installée pour les officiers (lit, matelas, traversin, table, lamps, &c.).

De même, les militaires français ou syriens ne pourront, en territoire turc, quitter les emprises du chemin de fer pour pénétrer plus avant en territoire turc ; ils pourront, là où la voie ferrée, sort de frontière, pénétrer en territoire syrien.

Dans tous les cas, des consignes très nettes devront être données aux commandants de détachements pour l'application de la convention ci-dessus.

| E 3935/59/44 |

No. 93.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 314.)

Sir,

Constantinople, June 23, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that on the 19th instant the press announced the discovery of a plot by which it had been intended to kill the President of the Republic at Smyrna. The conspiracy appears to have been given away at the last moment by one of the accomplices while the Ghazi was on his way from Brussa. The police acted with an energy which is natural to them on such occasions, and all suspects were securely locked up in time for Mustafa Kemal Pasha to enter Smyrna on the 16th in accordance with his programme.

2. It will probably be impossible ever to learn the whole truth, but from official communiqués and from newspaper accounts, unreliable though they are, a good deal can be gathered. The opinion has got about in some quarters that there never was any plot at all. This is, I think, wrong. It seems almost beyond doubt that there was a genuine conspiracy on the usual lines. One or two Laz desperadoes were sent off with revolvers and bombs from here and were joined at Smyrna by one or two others who are known to have been " fedais " since the days of the Committee of Union and Progress. They were to have made the attempt as the President entered the Government building. It is said that the desperadoes were working under the immediate orders of a Deputy, who belonged to the Opposition when there was one, and of an ex-Deputy. But it is impossible to say where the real instigation came from. As a matter of course, there have been wholesale arrests, but here, again, it is impossible to know precisely who has been arrested. Most of what was the parliamentary Opposition seem to be in prison or under detention in their houses—Refet Pasha, who had that moment returned from abroad, Bekir Sami Bey, Ismail Jamblat Bey, &c. Less known persons who were in opposition in the previous Assembly, and who belonged to the now abolished Progressive party, appear also to have been arrested or put under surveillance, and so do Dr. Nazim and other members of the Committee of Union and Progress at Smyrna. The Government is naturally not going to miss such a chance of enquiring into the activities of all possible opponents, but it is not to be supposed that most of these politicians had any sympathy with the plot, nor that the Government will take serious measures against any but a few whom it may suspect or convict of responsibility for the plot.

3. When I spoke to Hassan Bey, the Minister of Finance, he ascribed the conspiracy vaguely to a tendency in favour of the Caliphate. Discontent with the way religious institutions have been treated undoubtedly is still strong. There is discontent with the new taxes, and there is the discontent of those who are tired of being excluded from governing the country and from the profits to be made therefrom. Whether the motive were political, religious or personal, or all three at once, the occurrence was only what the Government must expect under so despotic a régime as the present one.

4. The Independence Tribunal has hastened to Smyrna, and the Ghazi continues to stay there at the hotel which has been given to him. An eye-witness tells me that the procession which filed past to express its sympathy was a very small one, and that Mustafa Kemal hardly showed himself at the window. On Sunday afternoon a monster demonstration of students and others blocked the traffic of the streets here. The President has issued a statement of some dignity thanking the people for their sympathy, describing the plot as an attempt against the republic rather than against himself, and declaring that nothing can kill the republic. The newspapers have, of course, seized upon the chance of reviving Mustafa Kemal Pasha's popularity. They extol his services to the country, and deplore the wickedness which can prompt anyone to take such a precious life. It is hard to think that there would not have been chaos if the attempt had succeeded, and for us the immediate moral seems to be the early ratification of the Irak Frontier Treaty.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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